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Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor:
The Duty of Providers to the Payers

of Medicare
Isaac D. Buck*
Five years and two near-death experiences later, the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) has restructured
the delivery of American health care. It has provided coverage to
millions of Americans who previously lacked it, outlawed
discriminationin the insurancemarketplace, and armedpatients with
consumer-based tools to streamline their care. The ACA has had a
positive impact throughoutthe country. But it can only go so far.

Separate from providing access, the most daunting challenge
facing American health care, and Medicare in particular, is how to
control expenditures and utilization in an era of unprecedented
enrollment growth. Past efforts to control expenditure and utilization
have failed, and starkly conflict with the dominant paradigm in
American health care that sanctifies the autonomy and nearly
unlimited discretion of the American health care provider. This
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paradigm often views attempts that seek cost-effectiveness as heavyhanded government intervention. But as Medicare's enrollment is
likely to swellfrom 52 million today to nearly 90 million by 2040, the
costs and utilization problem will not abate with age. While the ACA
may help reduce unnecessary and unwanted care and expand
coverage, it cannotfully address the overtreatmentproblem due to a
confluence of factors-namely, the often-acute emergent situations
and incomparable pain patients encounter, the imperfect agency

relationship between patients and payers, and the intractable
information asymmetry that exists within the enterprise.
This challenge begs for creative legal and policy-based
solutions that seek to maintain provider autonomy and patients'
freedom of choice, but also construct reasonable incentives and
limitations to prod providers and Medicare beneficiaries into
choosing more cost-effective treatments. It is made all the more
difficult by Medicare's reimbursement structure, a regime that still
largely rewards and incentivizes excess. Recognizing that tension,
this piece nods to previous scholarship that has suggested importing

fiduciary principles into the provider-patientrelationship, but builds
on it by arguingfor the inculcation offiduciary principles into the
largely unrecognized payer-provider relationship. Requiring the
provider to owe a duty of loyalty to the payers in the Medicare
enterprise-American taxpayers-would introduce pressures on

providers to limit excessive and expensive health care by opening the
doorfor Medicare to seek judicial remedies in cases of wrongdoing.
This new duty would further nuance the provider'sloyalties and also
reflect other professionals' multilayered duties of loyalty. Finally,
this move would not increase regulations governing providers, nor
rob them of their dear autonomy, but would limit unreasonable
health care costs and utilization where possible-something that,
heretofore, Medicare hasfailed to do.
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INTRODUCTION

In that moment of terror, I was anything but the well-informed, tough
customer with lots of options that a robustfree market counts on. I was
a puddle.1
-Steven Brill
In a striking piece for Time magazine, journalist Steven Brill-a leading
commentator on, and critic of, America's bloated health care systemdescribes his recent open-heart surgery. 3 Brill's article undoubtedly
personalizes, from the patient's perspective, the challenges facing the costcontrol effort in American health care 4-even though he has been scathing in
his critique in other works. 5
Arguing that doctors' and hospitals' financial incentives 6 or patients'
perceived moral hazard 7 cause too much unnecessary care is an easy academic

1. Steven Brill, What ILearnedfrom My $190,000 Surgery, TIME, Jan. 19, 2015, at 38.
2. See Richard Stengel, The High Cost of Care, TIME (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2136867,00.html
[http://perma.cc/A9N6RQ6A].
3. Brill, supra note 1, at 34.
4. Id.
5. See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://time.com/198/bitter-pill-why-medical-bills-are-killing-us [http://perma.cc/N24T-4WJ8]. That
piece by Brill drew criticism from the American Hospital Association. See Setting the RecordStraight
on TIME's Article "Bitter Pill," AM. HOSP. Ass'N (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.aha.org
/content/13/settingrecordstraight.pdf [http://perma.cc/6HWU-V4QK]; see also Chris Conover, 5
Myths in Steven Brill's "Bitter Pill"-Part 2, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.forbes.com
[http://perma.cc/AY93/sites/chrisconover/2013/03/07/5-myths-in-steven-brills-bitter-pill-part-2
6PR7].
6. See, e.g., Andrew Soergel, Study: Doctors PaidMore for Multiple Procedures than for
Multiple Patients, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news
/newsgram/articles/2014/12/08/study-doctors-paid-more-for-multiple-procedures-than-for-multiplepatients [http://perma.cc/TY49-JAJD] (noting that critics argue that "doctors have more financial
incentive to spend their time ordering potentially unnecessary tests or procedures for a single patient
than to efficiently treat an individual and move on"). Further, a 2014 study suggests that even two
years after the passage of the ACA's payment reforms, "the nation's highest-paid doctors still benefit
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exercise. But, as Brill shows, personally facing the fear and uncertainty that
confront patients on gurneys adds dimension and complexity to the struggle to
solve the uniquely American problem of overtreatment. 8 The uncertainty that
faces patient Brill swamps the overtreatment threat that concerns author Brill:
[A]s far as I was concerned, they could have tested my blood 10 times
a day if they thought that was best. They could have paid as much as
they wanted to that nurse's aide with the scale or to the woman who
flawlessly, without even a sting, took my blood. The doctor who had
given me an angiogram the afternoon before the surgery and then came
in the following week to check on me became just a nice guy who
cared, not someone who might be trying to add on an extra consult
bill. 9
Brill's first-person account illustrates the complicated challenges that even the
most well-informed, consumer-savvy patients face when confronted with an
emergent health concern. Often patients are helpless and weak, believing inand dependent on-the heroic goodness of the American provider.10
The law, however, is not aligned. When the patient is preoccupied, the
patient's legal and bioethical protections have little force. And the government
health care programs have not spent enough regulatory energy on building
flexible and common-sense rules that incentivize cost-effectiveness and limit
excess. Indeed, the overtreatment threat is particularly acute in Medicare,
from a fee-for-service payment model. ... 'In Medicare's fee-for-service system, some physicians are
collecting large fees by ordering services munificently."' Id.
7. Moral hazard is typically defined as the idea "that patients will overutilize health care
services unless they pay enough for them." John P. Geyman, Cost-Sharing Under Consumer-Driven
Health Care Will Not Reform U.S. Health Care, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 574, 574 (2012); see also M.
Gregg Bloche, The Invention ofHealth Law, 91 CALF. L. REv. 247, 252 (2003) (stating that moral
hazard is the idea that not having to pay for treatment alters the patient's treatment preference, but
ultimately noting the deficiencies in moral hazard theory as applied to health insurance because it
obscures normative questions and lacks same practical appeal as in other insurance contexts). But see
Geyman, supra (stating that the moral hazard theory has been "discredited by actual experience over
the years").
At a basic level, moral hazard stands for the idea that "[s]omeone else appears to be paying
for it, so who cares how much it costs?" SANDEEP JAUHAR, DOCTORED: THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF
AN AMERICAN PHYSICIAN 163 (2014).

8. See Brill, supra note 1, at 38 ("Fear of illness. Or pain. Or death. And wanting to do
something, anything, to avoid that for yourself or a loved one. ... There were occasions during those
eight days in the hospital when the non-drug-addled part of my brain wondered, when nurses came in
for a blood test twice a day, whether one test was enough and what the chargemaster cost for both was
going to look like. But most of the time the other part of my brain took over, the part that remembered
my terror during those blackouts and the overriding fear . .. that lingered in someone whose chest had
been sawed open and whose heart had been stopped."); see also Atul Gawande, Overkill, NEW
YORKER (May 11, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/l1/overkill-atul-gawande
[http://perma.cc/7EZG-EEWL] ("Virtually every family in the country ... has been subject to
overtesting and overtreatment in one form or another."); Americans Get Too Much Healthcare, Their
Does Say, REUTERS (Sept 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-too-much-healthcareidUSTRE78P5NN20110926 [http://perma.cc/L3DU-NBRY].
9. Brill, supra note 1, at 39.
10. Id.
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which lacks many of the tools that private insurance can use to limit cost and
excess,11 and particularly prevalent in clinical scenarios where multiple
treatment options seem reasonable.
But Medicare is not just a neutral party in the fight against overtreatment;
Medicare has actually played a role in causing overtreatment in the first
place 12 The nature of the health care enterprise and its reimbursement
mechanism directly enable the provider to recommend and steer the patient to
the more expensive, complex, and aggressive treatment. Even though
Medicare's reimbursement rules may be "extensive," 13 the fundamental nature
of health care payment still favors the provider-as it always has.14 The
provider enjoys the autonomy to recommend a treatment plan and receive

reimbursements for procedures and drugs without explicit reference to costs.15
Further, although it has shifted rapidly in recent years, 16 the chief
reimbursement mechanism still pays physicians based on the volume of the

&

11. See Isaac D. Buck, Breaking the Fever: A New Constructfor Regulating Overtreatment,
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1270-82 (2015) (discussing structural and policy-based barriers that
prevent Medicare from incorporating cost-effectiveness). This is particularly the case in the context of
paying for and approving new drugs. Id.
12. See, e.g., Christopher Weaver et al., How Medicare Rewards Copious Nursing-Home
Therapy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-medicare-rewards-copiousnursing-home-therapy-1439778701?modrssHealth&elqcid=1306202&x_id=
[http://perma.cc/SPW8-KU27] (noting the Medicare-created incentive for nursing homes to provide a
maximal amount of ultra-high-level care). Indeed, the payment structure for nursing home
reimbursement incentivizes clinically unnecessary and inappropriate care-and the amount of ultrahigh-level care varies wildly between different regions of the United States. Id.
13. See, e.g., CMS Tells Hospitals: If You Want Medicare Money, You Need to Post Your
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2014/05/01
(May
1,
2014),
Prices, ADVISORY
/cms-proposes-million-in-medicare-cuts-requires-hospitals-to-post-their-chargemasters
[http://perma.cc/FEV4-8DNW] (noting that Medicare's hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
System rule proposal totaled 1,600 pages).
14.
See Carl E. Schneider and Mark A. Hall, The PatientLife: Can Consumers DirectHealth
Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9-10 (2009) (noting the initial and enduring causes of increasing health
care expenditures). Indeed:
The financial structure of medical care also accelerates costs. Doctors and hospitals
commonly charge fees for services. The more services, the more fees; the higher the fees,
the higher the income. Doctors decide what patients need ... . But perhaps costs were
justified by the quality of care? Alas, doctors were presumptively the only qualified judges,
and the profession systematically refused to discuss or divulge quality concerns to
nonphysicians.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See generally Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost: Medicare Decisions,
Transparencyand Public Trust, 79 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (2010) (proposing a public discussion of the cost
of procedures in Medicare).
16. See Better, Smarter, Healthier: In Historic Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals and
Timeline for Shifting Medicare Reimbursements from Volume to Value, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH
HUMAN SERvs. (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/01/26/better-smarter-healthierin-historic-announcement-hhs-sets-clear-goals-and-timeline-for-shifting-medicare-reimbursementsfrom-volume-to-value.html [http://perma.cc/CRT7-MU4H] (noting that Medicare is introducing new
payment structures in an attempt to tie 90 percent of all payments to quality-rather than volume-of
care by 2018).
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services they provide." The two parties in the room-the patient and the
provider-have little incentive to limit costs and utilization solely for the good
of the Medicare program.18
With preoccupied, pained patients and providers inadequately pressured
to be cost-effective, no party to the clinical relationship is incentivized to limit
utilization. The one party who would be likely to push for limits on utilization
and cost is the payer-in Medicare, the American taxpayer. 19 Nevertheless, the
payer is an unrecognized participant in the health care delivery system and,
legally, the payer in the Medicare program is almost a nonparty. Unlike in
other buyer-seller scenarios, the payer for services for Medicare beneficiaries
has been startlingly unable to influence the participating provider. As a result,
providers' influence over payers has begun to parallel the so-called
monopolistic power that providers enjoy over their patients. 20 Extensive

17. The trend is away from solely volume-based reimbursement, however. See Better Care.
Smarter Spending. HealthierPeople: Paying Providersfor Value, Not Volume, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Factsheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-01-26-3.htm [http://perma.cc/WC3S-973R] (noting that in 2014,
"an estimated 20 percent of Medicare reimbursements had shifted to [alternative payment models],"
and that by 2016, the goal is 30 percent). Nevertheless, even some alternative payment models still
incorporate volume. See JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 101 ("Under [Pay for Performance], there is
pressure to treat even when the diagnosis isn't firm"). And the drug reimbursement structure still
provides an incentive to order more expensive drugs. See discussion and accompanying notes, infra
Part I.
18. In fact, providers not only lack any incentive to limit costs, they actually have an incentive
to increase costs. See JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 228 ("As is so often the case in our health care system,
doctors' incentives do not serve broader social goals. This virtually guarantees that proposed reforms
like cutting readmissions, reducing unnecessary testing, and adopting computerized medical records
will fail.... Our system, structured to encourage overutilization, needs to provide some inducements
to reduce the amount of health care, too."); Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as
Choice Architecture. The Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis,
112 MICH. L. REv. 523, 541 (2014) (noting that providers face an "even worse" moral hazard problem
in that "whereas patients have the private incentive to demand all tests and treatments with a positive
expected value net of nonfinancial costs, providers have a profit incentive to recommend even tests
and treatments that have a negative expected value to the patient"). Patients, however, may have some
incentive to limit costs. See Medicare 2016 Costs at a Glance, MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/costs-at-a-glance/osts-at-glance.html
[http://perma.cc/WRN3-3Q7K] (last visited Jan. 26, 2016) (noting the coinsurance and deductible
amounts beneficiaries are required to satisfy for care covered by Medicare in 2016).
19. See How Is Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOv, http://www.medicare.gov/about-us/howmedicare-is-funded/medicare-funding.html [http://perma.cc/854X-GWML] (last visited July 12, 2015)
(stating that Medicare is funded by payroll taxes, "income taxes paid on Social Security benefits,"
interest, and premiums); see also The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (July 24, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-spending-and-financing-factsheet [http://perma.cc/FMJ2-FSWX] (last visited Jan. 4, 2016) (breaking down financing of each piece
of Medicare program).
20. See Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and
the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REv. 643, 652 (2008) ("Not only can illness cripple the
patient as seeker of information and maker of decisions, but the sick must engage with doctors in ways
that unfit them for the market. Patients rely so much on their doctors that their purchasing choices are

severely constricted, so constricted that it is hardly too much to say that doctors wield something like
monopoly power over patients.").
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academic thought has been devoted to the correct characterization of the
patient-provider relationship,21 but scholars have paid little attention to the
provider-payer relationship, at least when the payer is the federal government
and the insurance program is Medicare.
This Article draws on the central tenets of fiduciary law and seeks to
apply them to the payer-provider relationship to better protect the fiscal health
of the Medicare program. In some ways, this analysis builds on and extends the
argument espoused by Professor Maxwell Mehlman in pushing for the
fiduciary metaphor's application to the doctor-patient relationship. 22 Of course,
this proposal is different in kind. This Article extends the argument to the
government payer of those health services contending that the provider should
not only have a fiduciary duty to each patient, but also a fiduciary duty to the
party footing the bill, at least for the Medicare program with its unique
financing structure.23

21. One of the more recent developments in academic thinking on the patient-provider
relationship has been the inculcation and recognition of the fiduciary paradigm in the clinical setting.
Academics have argued that the provider-patient relationship is a fiduciary relationship, and thus
subject to the protections of fiduciary law that safeguard the trust so necessary to a healing clinical
relationship. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463, 477-82 (2002)
(highlighting trust's many values in the patient-provider relationship, including how patient trust may
even impact a given treatment plan's effectiveness); David H. Thom et al., Measuring Patients' Trust
in Physicians When Assessing Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. 124, 125 (2004) (noting that "[t]rust
is widely recognized as being central to the doctor-patient relationship"). In some ways, these
conclusions are rather unremarkable; it is unsurprising that the provider must be a loyal and
trustworthy fiduciary to each patient they treat. Perhaps some patients assume that the doctor-patient
relationship has always contained this explicit guarantee. See id.
22. Recent proposals have included creative ideas for incorporating the fiduciary relationship
into the provider-patient enterprise. See Anna B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for
Innovation?, 36 CARDOZO L. REv. 913 (2015) (arguing for a "fiduciary framework" to police
physicians who innovate, with a particular focus on the decision-making process and not on the
substance of the ultimate clinical decision).
23. I use Medicare as the prominent example in the piece. Public insurance is the focus of the
analysis, mainly because taxpayers do not have to pay into the pools that fund any one particular
private insurance plan, unlike the federal public health insurance programs. Medicare is an appropriate
choice because of its structural limitations in incorporating cost-effectiveness, political prominence,
and growing size. See NHE FactSheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and[http://perma.cc/L5H6-HQMR] (noting
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.html
that Medicare spending was $585.7 billion in 2013); Projected Change in Medicare Enrollment,
2000-2050, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 15, 2013), http://kff.org/medicare/slide/projected-change-inmedicare-enrollment-2000-2050 [http://perma.cc/Y7VW-6ZDM]; New Analysis Shows More Than 28
Million Baby Boomers Will Develop Alzheimer's Disease; Will Consume Nearly 25% of Medicare
Spending, ALZHEIMER'S AsSoc., Jul. 20, 2015, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/newanalysis-shows-more-than-28-million-baby-boomers-will-develop-alzheimers-disease-will-consumenearly-25-of-medicare-spending-300115351.html. Significantly, "[i]f there are no significant advances
in Alzheimer's treatment or prevention, ... [b]y 2040, when the baby boom generation is aged 76-94,
the projected Medicare costs ($328.15 billion, in 2014 dollars) increase to 24.2% of total Medicare
spending." Id.
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While Medicare's payment policies have modernized under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), 24 the importation of
fiduciary principles into the legal relationship between the provider and payer
would further minimize the volume-based incentives that still push providers to
constantly provide more treatment. This paradigmatic solution would be
broader than imposing new alternative payment techniques on Medicare
providers-particularly when it comes to other health care treatment decisions
where providers continue to enjoy nearly unchecked discretion, even under the
new reimbursement regimes.2 5
No matter the reimbursement regime, enterprising doctors will find ways
to increase profits. 26 Application of fiduciary principles fits classically here
because-like in the corporate context-the provider has a personal financial
incentive that could conflict with the financial interests of the public payers.
Like when applied to a corporate board of directors, fiduciary law can
counteract the Medicare provider's profit motive. And like shareholders in a
corporation, Medicare's payers need additional protection.
Finally, recognition of a payer-provider fiduciary relationship would
enrich the provider's duties of loyalty and align legal protections with the
reality of health care delivery in modern America. The provider's primary duty
of loyalty would remain to the patient, but this shift would enable Medicare to
influence the provider to, where possible, avoid recommending treatment
options that may be futile, unnecessary, and overly expensive when compared
to clinically acceptable alternatives. This analysis recognizes that, like lawyers,
providers have nuanced and multiple professional duties. Given Medicare's
financial challenges, viewing the provider's loyalties as belonging to a singular
constituent is outdated and impractical in America's modern health care
enterprise.

24. See Better Care. SmarterSpending. HealthierPeople,supra note 17.
25. See discussion and accompanying notes, infra Part I; see also William Shrank et al.,
Correcting the Blind Spot in Accountability: The Role of Pharmacy Care, HEALTH AFT. BLOG (June
25, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/06/25/correcting-the-blind-spot-in-accountability-therole-of-pharmacy-care [http://perma.cc/YE33-Y9SS] ("In addition, bundled payments and patientcontered medical home programs target hospitals and prinary care providers to promote higher quality
and lower cost care. All these programs have largely excluded prescription drug costs in their calculus,
and offer no direct incentives for Part D plans to participate in and improve care.").
As of summer 2015, many providers taking advantage of the new coordinated care model
of accountable care organizations (ACOs)--one of the many ACA tools that seeks to improve costeffectiveness-"ha[d] no meaningful incentive to promote cost-effective medication use," although
that may be changing. Shrank, supra. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have
indicated an interest in increasing coordination between pharmaceutical companies and ACOs. Id. In
late June 2014, CVS Caremark announced a partnership with seven ACOs in California, New Jersey,
and Florida. See Zacks Equity Research, CVS Forms Pharmacy Care Alliance, NASDAQ (June 30,
2014),
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/cvs-forms-pharmacy-care-alliance-analyst-blog-cm366537
[http://perma.cc/M4DJ-L3W5].
26. See JAUHAR, supranote 7, at 96-97.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the overtreatment
threat and presents a prominent recent example of the lack of regulation of
overtreatment and excess costs. Part II summarizes the current attempt to
empower patients, with a focus on consumer-based tools. Part III highlights
general fiduciary analysis principles to set the stage for the application of those
principles to the payer-provider relationship. And finally, Part IV presents a
new fiduciary analysis applied to the provider-payer relationship to rein in
American overtreatment and overutilization. Further, Part IV summarizes the
policy reasons that support importation of the fiduciary duty into this vital but
infrequently addressed relationship.
I.
THE CHALLENGE OF EXCESS

Given the state of the patient at the "gurney moment," reining in the
majority of American healthcare excess is dependent on influencing the
provider. This entails mixing the appropriate amount of controls with the right
number of incentives for the Medicare provider, the expert actor who
coordinates and suggests the scans, procedures, pills, and surgeries that cost the
American taxpayer hundreds of billions of dollars-in 2014, $505 billion.27 But
it is difficult for any cost-conscious regime to battle the incentives baked into
the Medicare reimbursement framework, which lead providers to administer
extra tests and procedures, as well as more expensive devices and drugs. 28 And
because the mind of the patient-like Steven Brill-is often elsewhere,
counting on the typical Medicare beneficiary to push the doctor into
administering "less" or cheaper health care is unlikely to succeed in many
clinical circumstances. Unsurprisingly, the patient remains largely powerless to
prevent unnecessary care and utilization. 29
Adding to the challenge, overtreatment-a chief driver of financial waste
in American health care-has many causes and species. Overtreatment may
include care that is not medically necessary; care that is necessary, but
inefficient; and "discretionary care of questionable value," 30 or what Atul

27. The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing,supra note 19. This was the total figure
for Medicare outlays in 2014, which includes an offset in the expenditures for collected premiums and
other payments; Medicare's benefit payments totaled $597 billion in 2014.
28. See discussion and accompanying notes, infra Part I.A.
29. See Billions Spent by Medicare on Unnecessary Procedures, KAISER HEALTH NEWS:
KHN MORNING BRIEFING (May 13, 2014), http://khn.org/morning-breakout/overtreatment-medicare
[http://perma.cc/5MMC-6BT7] (noting that up to 42 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were subject to
unnecessary ("low-value") medical care, totaling $8.5 billion in wasted spending); Study Measures
Low-Value Care in Medicare, May Reflect Broad Overuse, JAMA INTERNAL MED. (May 12, 2014),
http://media.jamanetwork.com/news-item/study-measures-low-value-care-in-medicare-may-reflectbroad-overuse [http://perma.cc/TM92-EBC6].
30. See Jessica Mantel, Spending Medicare's Dollars Wisely: Taking Aim at Hospitals'
Cultures of Overtreatment,49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 121, 124 (2015).
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Gawande calls "no-value care." 3 1 Other causes of medical waste, like fraud and
abuse and excessive administrative costs, are often also included under the
overtreatment umbrella.32
As a result, overtreatment is both a market reality and the result of a
clinical decision. In other words, medical care might just be too expensive3 3 or
a physician may administer a procedure or drug that is not as cost-effective as a
clinically acceptable alternative (or even a therapeutic equivalent).
Overtreatment may also occur in scenarios that have nothing to do with either
the price of care or the clinical decision-making of the provider. These cases
feature excessive administrative costs, wherein the health care entity's lack of
care coordination costs the system more. Finally, another complication to the
analysis is that many care-delivery episodes do not fit squarely within one type
of overtreatment or another-instead, they are amalgams of different species. 34
Additionally, whether a given treatment is overtreatment depends on the
individuality of each patient. A procedure may be medically necessary for a
particular patient, but inefficient as compared to a reasonable alternative. That
same procedure may not be medically necessary when performed on a different
patient. Finally, on a third patient, the procedure may both be necessary and the
most efficient clinical option.
It is easy to see that policing this kind of activity by differentiating the
necessary from the unnecessary, the efficient from the inefficient, and maybe
even the fraudulent from the legitimate poses a complex challenge for
Medicare. Particularly in situations where multiple clinical options seem
reasonable, the "grey" cases in which clinically minute details separate the
appropriate from the inappropriate-the dark corner within American health
care where overtreatment and excessive utilization thrives-are the most
difficult to detect and deter.
Each of these species of overtreatment may require its own legal and
policy-based solution. What follows is an example of one type of
overtreatment-what Professor Jessica Mantel has called inefficient care, or
"tests and treatments that are more costly than alternatives of similar
therapeutic value."35 In cases like these, providers make the common-sense

31. Gawande, supra note 8.
32. See Isaac D. Buck, Enforcement Overdose: Health Care Fraud Regulation in an Era of
Overcriminalization and Overtreatment, 74 MD. L. REv. 259, 275 (2015); see also Mantel, supra note
30, at 123 n.7.
33. See Sam Stebbins & Thomas C. Frohlich, CountriesSpending the Most on Health Care,
USA TODAY (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/11/14/24-7-wallst-countries-spend-most-health-care/75771044 [http://perma.cc/7HJ8-2L8K] (reporting that the United
States's annual health care spending is "by far the most of any country in the world"); see, e.g., Erin
Fuse Brown, IrrationalHospitalPricing, 14 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 11, 14 (2014).
34. Whether or not a procedure is necessary but inefficient, or wholly unnecessary, is muddied
by the realities of clinical variation and expert disagreement. See Buck, supra note 32, at 305-06
(relating how investigated providers can claim their care was simply more aggressive than others).
35. See Mantel, supra note 30, at 124.
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argument that they are the clinical expert party and are in the best position to
determine what procedures and drugs have the best therapeutic value.
Nevertheless, with a Medicare program facing decades of exploding
enrollment, these scenarios present stark reminders of the shortcomings of
current regulation and the need for a reasonable but robust solution.
A.

An Expensive Blind Spot

Age-related macular degeneration (AMD) 36 is a "common eye condition"
that causes damage "to the macula, a small spot near the center of the retina
and part of the eye needed for sharp, central vision." 37 As it progresses, AMD
causes an increasingly blurry area to form "near the center of vision," which
may grow larger or cause "blank spots," and ultimately results in loss of
eyesight. 38 The leading cause of blindness in older Americans, 39 AMD
particularly affects the most elderly-as many as 22 percent of Americans
older than eighty-five live with the condition. 40
Further, as many as fifteen million Americans are currently living with the
condition. 4 1 With an increasing elderly population, that number is expected to
grow.42 Diagnosed cases of AMD increased from 1.7 million in 2000 to nearly
2.1 million in 2010.43 The number of new AMD cases in 2030 is projected to
top 3.5 million, with more than 5 million Americans expected to be diagnosed

36. See Avastin and Lucentis Are Equivalent in Treating Age-Related Macular Degeneration,
NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/apr20l2/nei-30a.htm [http://
perma.cc/9GUE-Z2PT].
37. Facts About Age-Related Macular Degeneration, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (Sept. 2015),
http://www.nei.nih.gov/health/maculardegen/armdfacts.asp#1 [http://perma.cc/SKM4-XH27].
38. Id.
39. See Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, An Effective Eye Drug Is Available for $50. But
Many Doctors Choose a $2,000 Alternative, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/business/economy/an-effective-eye-drug-is-available-for-50-but-many-doctors-choose-a-2000[http://perma.cc/3HDPalternative/2013/12/07/la96628e-55e7-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html
XAKD].
40.

See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE STATE OF VISION, AGING, AND

PUBLIC HEALTH IN AMERICA
[http://perma.cc/7RJY-4H6B].
41.

See

MACULAR

7 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/visionhealth/pdf/visionbrief.pdf
DEGENERATION

PARTNERSHIP,

http://www.amd.org

[http//perma.cc/8WEA-8VMM] (last visited July 14, 2014).
42.

See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE STATE OF AGING AND HEALTH IN

AMERICA 2013 ii (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/features/agingandhealth/stateof agingandhealth
_in_america_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/FZ8P-QEXK] (noting recent growth in the number and
proportion of older adults is unprecedented in U.S. history). Two factors-longer life spans and aging
baby boomers-will combine to double the population of Americans aged sixty-five or older during
the next twenty-five years to about seventy-two million. By 2030, these older adults will account for
roughly 20 percent of the U.S. population. Id.
43. See Age-Related Macular Degeneration (AMD), NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH
https://www.nei.nih.gov/eyedata/amd.asp#6b [http://perma.cc/MPJ6-5CRM] (last visited July 14,
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in 2050.44 Cases of "early" AMD could also number nearly 18 million by
2050.45
Two drugs, Lucentis and Avastin, are used to treat AMD. Genentech, a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Roche Group, manufactures both.46 Even
though Lucentis has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to treat AMD and Avastin has not 47-leaving it completely reliant on
physicians' off-label usage 48-numerous recent studies have concluded that the
two drugs are equally effective, with one calling them "virtually identical." 49
Both are highly successful in treating AMID and one principal investigator of a

44. Id.
45. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 40, at 7; What Is Macular
Degeneration?, AM. MACULAR DEGENERATION FOUND., https://www.macular.org/what-maculardegeneration [http://perma.cc/PT7Q-TESJ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (presenting the stages of AMD
and noting that "[e]arly AMD is diagnosed by the presence of medium-sized drusen").
46. See
(Bevacizumab), ROCHE,
Avastin
http://www.roche.com/products/productdetails.htm?type=product&id=69 [http://perma.cc/T3SQ-N5CR] (last visited July 10, 2014); Avastin®
(Bevacizumab), GENENTECH, http://www.gene.com/patients/medicines/Avastin
[http://perma.cc
/BZN6-JLYP] (last visited July 10, 2014); Lucentis (Ranibizumab Injection), ROCHE,
http://www.roche.com/products/product-details.htm?type=product&id=133
[http://perma.cc/7GHNLCE6] (last visited July 10, 2014) (indicating that Lucentis is "[s]old in the US via Genentech").
47. See Art Jahnke, Medicare Data Reveals $1 Billion a Year for Costly Eye Drug, BU
TODAY (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.bu.edu/today/2014/medicare-data-reveals-i-billion-a-year-forcostly-eye-drug [http://perma.cc/GU8T-AKCC] ("[T]here is really nothing to be gained by getting onlabel approval of Avastin, because physicians have the right to use a drug for any indication once it is
out on the open market.").
48. Id.; see John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on
Regulating Off-Label Scientifc and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L., & ETHICS
299, 336-38 (2010) ("Genentech was at the very least in a terribly awkward position during the period
2004 to 2007 as interest in off-label use of Avastin intensified.").
49. NIH Study Finds Avastin and Lucentis Are Equally Effective in Treating Age-Related
Macular Degeneration, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH, NAT'L EYE INST. (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://www.nei.nih.gov/news/pressreleases/04281.asp [http://perma.cc/A9XY-HBNP]; see also John
Gever, Cancer DrugAvastin May Be Cheap Solutionfor Macular Degeneration, ABC NEWS (Apr. 4,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/EyeHealthMacularTreatment/Avastin-Lucentis-perform-equallycost-difference-study-shows/story?id=13480048 [http://perma.cc/EPZ8-Q6K7]; Beth Levine, Drugs to
Treat Vision Loss, AARP BULL. (June 15, 2012), http://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info06-2012/drugs-to-treat-vision-loss.html [http://perma.cc/E452-8FZG].
In a first-of-its-kind study in 2011, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) undertook a
two-year clinical trial to compare how well the two drugs worked in treating AMD. See Avastin and
Lucentis Are Equivalent in Treating Age-Related Macular Degeneration, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH,
NAT'L EYE INST. (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.nei.nih.gov/news/pressreleases/043012.asp
[http://perma.cc/EN5Z-4XHL] ("[P]rior to the Comparison of AMD Treatments Trials (CATI), a
two-year clinical trial, the two drugs had never been compared head-to-head."); NIH Study Finds
Avastin and Lucentis are Equally Effective in Treating Age-Related Macular Degeneration, supra.
The results indicated that the treatments "had equivalent effects on visual acuity when administered
according to the same schedule." CATT Res. Grp., Ranibizumab and Bevacizumabfor Neovascular
Age-Related MacularDegeneration, 364 N. ENG. J. MED. 1897, 1897 (2011). The improvements for
patients using either drug were "virtually identical (within one letter difference on an eye chart)." NIH
Study Finds Avastin and Lucentis Are Equally Effective in Treating Age-Related Macular
Degeneration,supra.
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recent study even said, "The dramatic and lasting improvement in vision with
these two drugs is extraordinary."5 0
As AMD affects a number of elderly Americans, Medicare covers both of
the drugs with few restrictions. Indeed, America's "crown jewel"51 public
insurance program is Lucentis's "largest single customer."52 Together, Lucentis
and Avastin accounted for "one sixth[] of the Medicare Part B drug spending in
2010."53
Even though the production costs for each drug are similar,54 the costs
charged per injection are radically different: Avastin costs $50 per injection
and Lucentis costs about $2,000 per injection. 55 As a result, the "annual
maximum cost of treating a patient with Avastin is $650, and the annual cost of
treatment with Lucentis is $50,000."56 According to a 2012 report by the
inspector general of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), "[T]he final cost of a dose of Avastin is about 1 percent the cost of a
dose of Lucentis, on average ($26 vs. $1,928)."57 And Lucentis constituted
"nearly 10% of the entire Medicare part B drug budget" in 2010.58

50. See NIH Study Finds Avastin and Lucentis Are Equivalent in Treating Age-Related
Macular Degeneration, supra note 49. Rates of serious adverse events-"such as stroke, heart attack
and death"-were "similar for patients who received either drug." Two-Year Results Confirm Strong
Efficacy of Two Drugs in Treatment of Age-Related Macular Degeneration, YAHOO FIN. (May 2,
2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/two-results-confirm-strong-efficacy-113000348.html
[http://
perma.cc/F3C3-QKVF] (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). Even though serious adverse events occurred in 40
percent of participants on Avastin and 32 percent of participants on Lucentis, the events for those on
Avastin "were distributed across many different conditions," and "[f]ewer doses were associated with
a higher rate of [serious adverse events]," which was "not a typical dose-response relationship." See
Avastin and Lucentis Are Equivalent in Treating Age-Related Macular Degeneration, supra note 49.
Finally, the number of adverse events was "low and similar for both drugs during the study," and the
researchers were "not capable of determining whether there [was] an association between a particular
adverse event and treatment." Id.
51. See Robert Kuttner, Opinion, Medicare "Cost-Savings" Rules Pushing Costs onto
Patients, Bos. GLOBE (July 18, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/18/medicaredisguised-form-rationing/W6sF7dkTWO8oGOSekzlF/story.html [http://perma.cc/FKF6-7GT3].
52. Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 39.
53. Diedtra Henderson, Switch From Lucentis to Avastin Could Save Medicare $18B,
MEDSCAPE MED. NEWs (June 17, 2014), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/826911
[http://perma.cc/5KQ8-X6RF] ("Medicare could slash $18 billion in spending over the course of 10
years if physicians treatedpatients with ... Avastin instead of... Lucentis.").
Medicare Part B covers all physician services, while Medicare Part A is responsible for
coverage of inpatient treatment. See P.M. Danzon, Pricing and Reimbursement of Biopharmaceuticals
and Medical Devices in the USA, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA HEALTH ECON. 127, 128-29 (2014). The two
drugs are reimbursed through Part B because they are administered on an outpatient basis, often in the
physicians' offices. Id.
54. Henderson, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. Jahnke, supra note 47.
57. DANIEL R. LEVINSON, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE PAYMENTS FOR
DRUGS

USED

TO TREAT WET AGE-RELATED

http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-10-00360.pdf

MACULAR

DEGENERATION

14 (Apr. 2012),

[http://permacc/2MPC-5UZ3]

(ultimately

recommending that CMS "direct a provider education initiative to educate ophthalmologists about the
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This results in no small expense. According to The Washington Post,
"Doctors choose the more expensive drug more than half a million times every
year, a choice that costs the Medicare program ... an extra $1 billion or more
annually."5 9 Another report has soberly noted that Medicare would save as
much as $1.4 billion annually if providers switched from Lucentis to Avastin. 60
That Lucentis is more expensive obviously makes it more profitable for
Genentech-but also more profitable for participating Medicare physicians
who prescribe it. 61 When physicians use the drugs in their offices, Medicare
Part B currently reimburses them for the average price of the drug plus 6
percent. 62 Thanks to this reimbursement formula, 63 for each dosage of Lucentis
administered, the physician's profit from Medicare is $120; for Avastin, it is
slightly more than $3.64
In March 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
announced a proposed rule to change the reimbursement structure under
Medicare Part B and test different alternative payment policies over five
years.65 One such alternative is a reimbursement scheme that would pay the
physician the average sales price plus 2.5 percent, in addition to a "flat fee

clinical issues regarding Lucentis and Avastin ... as well as the implications of the wide variance in
cost on the program and beneficiaries").
58. Daniel F. Martin et al., Ranibizumab and Bevacizumab for Treatment of Neovascular Age-

Related Macular Degeneration: 2-Year Results, 119 OPHTHALMOLOGY 1388, 1397 (2012).
59. Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 39; see also Jahnke, supra note 47.
60. See Jodie Tillman, Tale of Two Eye Drugs Plays Out in Medicare's Doctor
Reimbursements, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/healtb/tale-oftwo-eye-drugs-plays-out-in-medicares-doctor-reimbursements/2175218
[http://perma cc/UU5J-

WRBS].

&

61. Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 39 (noting that Genetech "reaps far more profit when it
sells [Lucentis]").
62. See id.; see also Bradley J. Fikes, Eye Drug Is Medicare's Big Cost, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB. (Apr. 12, 2014), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2014/apr/12/avastin-lucentismedicare-genentech-roche [http://perma.cc/JS5G-JLQK]; Andrew Pollack, Genentech Offers Secret
Rebates for Eye Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), http-/www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/business
/04eye.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7PWV-PKHW].
63. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., MMA -July2005 Quarterly Average Sales Price
(ASP) Medicare PartB Drug PricingFile, Effective July 1, 2005, CTRs. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERvS. (July 1, 2005), http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-NetworkMLN/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/mm3783.pdf
[http://perma.cc/42HZ-7BKA]
(stating the
formula applicable to "drugs ... not paid on a cost or prospective payment basis"); see also id. ("The
ASP is based on quarterly drug information supplied to CMS by drug manufacturers.").
64. See Kevin Drum, Doctors Begin to Notice that Health Care Is Really Expensive, MOTHER
JONES (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/04/doctors-begin-noticehealth-care-really-expensive [http://perma.cc/HA8L-XXPW].
65. CMS Proposes to Test New Medicare Part B Prescription Drug Models to Improve
Quality of Care and Deliver Better Value for Medicare Beneficiaries, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
MEDICAID SERvS. (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press[http://perma.cc/C72H-8PB3]; How to Reduce
releases/2016-Press-releases-items/2016-03-08.html
Medicare Drug Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/opinion/howto-reduce-medicare-drug-costs.html [http://perma.cc/T3GB-AYPR].
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payment of $16.80 per drug per day." 66 These proposed reimbursement
policies, which will likely take years to test,67 have already faced harsh
criticism. 68 And despite the reduced percentage awarded to the physicians in
the new CMS proposal, blunted incentives to prescribe the more expensive
Lucentis over Avastin may remain. 69
Indeed, in an effort to increase use of Lucentis, Genentech began a
volume-based rebate program in 2010, where "medical practices [could] earn
up to tens of thousands of dollars in rebates each quarter if they use[d] a lot of
Lucentis and if their usage increase[d] from the previous quarter." 70
Nevertheless, The Washington Post reported in 2014 that "U.S. doctors have
been using Avastin in about 56 percent" of cases, 71 and about 61 percent of
doctors reported to a recent American Society of Retinal Specialists survey that
they preferred Avastin for macular degeneration. 72 Under the American
Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics, it is unethical for a
provider to prescribe a drug "for the physician's financial benefit." 73
Genentech argues that Lucentis is "the most appropriate medicine" 74 for
treating AMD, and has also reportedly pointed out that Avastin is more
dangerous than Lucentis. 75 Bizarrely, Genentech reportedly aimed to
discourage Avastin use for safety reasons because the drug "was not approved
by the FDA for use in the eye." 76 These claims, however, seem unsupported. 77
Accordingly, Genentech's request to the FDA seeking to "change the Avastin
label to instruct doctors that it was not to be used for eyes," was denied, with
the FDA responding that "there was no evidence to support such a change to
the label." 78
66.

CMS Proposes to Test New Medicare Part B Prescription Drug Models to Improve

Quality ofCare and Deliver Better Value for MedicareBeneficiaries, supra note 65.
67. See id.
68. See Virgil Dickson, Does CMS' PartB Drug ProposalUsurp ClinicalJudgment?, MoD.
HEALTHCARE (Mar.
10, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160310/NEWS
/160309849 [http://perma.cc/7GFM-JGPZ] ("The pharmaceutical industry, oncology groups and
Republican lawmakers quickly and harshly criticized the proposal as inappropriately experimenting
with patients' medical treatments.").
69. Presumably, under the new CMS proposal, a physician's payment per day and per
administration of Lucentis would be $66.80 (2.5 percent of average sales price plus $16.80) instead of
$120. For Avastin, it would be $18.05 (same calculation).
70. See Pollack, supranote 62.
71. See Whoriskey & Keating, supranote 39.
72. Id.
73. See Opinion 8.03-Conflicts of Interest: Guidelines, AM. MED. Ass'N (June 1994),
http://www.ama-assriorg//ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion803.page [http://perma.cc/9Z4S-WMBE].
74. See Whoriskey & Keating, supranote 39.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. ("[I]ndependent scientists say such worries are unsupported by the six trials that have
been conducted.").
78. Id.; see also Fiona Godlee, Avastin Versus Lucentis, BMJ (May 2, 2012),
http://www.bmj.com/content/344/bmj.e3l62 [http://perma.cc/8YUW-D72H] ("Despite evidence that
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The costs difference has a real impact on the budget for Medicare Part B.
As noted:
CMS will spend $20 billion and patients will spend $5 billion on
bevacizumab [Avastin] and ranibizumab [Lucentis] over the next
decade. If all patients immediately switched to bevacizumab and
continued using it over the ten-year period, CMS spending on these
drugs would drop to about $2 billion (savings, $18 billion) over the
decade-long period, and patients would spend $420 million (savings,
nearly $5 billion). 79
Nevertheless, to this point, "Medicare has been powerless to do anything but
pay up" for Lucentis. 80 Completely "forbidden from restricting payment to the
amount of the less costly alternative," 81 and perhaps complicit in creating the
environment for drug price inflation, 82 Medicare has faced calls by health
policy experts for the program to either increase the reimbursement amount for
Avastin or simply switch the coverage determination to only cover Avastin. 83
Recently proposed changes may not fully solve the problem. 84
The Department of Justice (DOJ) also appears unable to offer
comprehensive solutions to the overtreatment challenge. Because regulators
cannot argue that administration of Lucentis is medically unnecessary, they are
largely stymied from bringing overtreatment-based health care fraud
investigations. Overly expensive clinical decisions that target the patient's

&

it works in macular degeneration, the manufacturers and marketers (Roche in the US, Novartis in the
UK and elsewhere) are actively discouraging its use for this condition, even going so far as taking
legal action to prevent such off-label use... . Because they want people to use their other drug,
ranibuzinab, which is licensed for treating macular degeneration.").
79. See D.W. Hutton et al., Switching to Less Expensive Blindness Drug Could Save Medicare
PartB $18 Billion over a Ten-Year Period, 33 HEALTH AFF. 931, 934 (2014).
80. See Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 39.
81. Id.
82. See Danzon, supra note 53, at 131 (showing that the "ASP + 6% reimbursement rule
creates perverse incentives for manufacturers to compete by charging high rather than low prices,
because a higher price offers a larger margin to the dispensing physician," and noting that these
incentives "have probably contributed to higher prices for oncologics and other biologics in the U.S.").
83. Indeed, because Medicare requires care to be "reasonable and necessary," but requires no
cost-effectiveness metric, when a provider seeks reimbursement for the administration of overly
expensive drugs, no false statement is made to the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)
(2012) ("No payment may be made under part A or part B of this subchapter for any expenses incurred
for items or services ... which ... are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury or to improve the fimctioning of a malformed body member .... "); Fox, supra note
15, at 50 (suggesting that regulators be "empowered" and "compelled" to consider cost effectiveness
when determining coverage policy); Health Insurance Claim Form, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMS-Forms/downloads
/CMS1500805.pdf [http://perma.cc/6356-F6XW] (last visited July 13, 2015) ("I certify that the

services shown on this form wero medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient ...
."); see also Medicare Billing: 837P and Form CMS-1500, DEP'T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Oct.
2014),
http://www.cms.gov/outreach-and-education/medicare-learning-network-mln/mnproducts
/downloads/837p-cms-1500.pdf [http://perma.cc/49Z4-6LET] (noting that "Medicare payment
requires that an item or service .. . [i]s reasonable and necessary").
84. See text and accompanying note, supra note 68.
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medical needs do not, by their nature, constitute actionable fraud because the
decisions cannot be alleged to lack medical necessity. 85 Indeed, because
participating providers exclusively decide which drugs are appropriate for their
patients, the DOJ cannot argue that these highly expensive clinical decisions
are illegal, or even abusive.
But the use of Lucentis certainly seems wasteful and highlights CMS's
inability to adequately police clinical decisions that impact Medicare's costs.
The program allows providers the freedom to choose the drug to prescribewhile simultaneously paying the providers multiples more for one of the two
drugs. In short, the Lucentis-Avastin story is one without any legal answer, and
one that illustrates the inadequate tools that currently govern health care
delivery. The story calls for a paradigm shift in American medicine that seeks
not only to increase the funds used to fight fraud, but also to refine those tools
so that they are more flexible and targeted.
II.
THE ILL-FITTING CONSUMER-BASED REGIME

As Mark Hall and Carl Schneider presciently argued, American patients
are not good consumers. 86 Even though the terrain-shifting ACA seems to build
on the assumption that consumer-based protections are good for patients, 87 the
relationship between patients and providers is unlike a pure buyer-seller
transaction. Consumer tools may help, 88 but there are too many individually

85. See Hutton, supra note 79; see also Henderson, supra note 53.
86. Hall & Schneider, supra note 20, at 659 ("We have seen that across the board patients are
ill equipped and badly positioned to purchase medical care well. So extreme are these disabilities that
patients must often be wonderfully fortunate even to ascertain the most basic kind of market
information-price. Patients, then, will rarely know enough to be successful consumers and will
normally follow their doctors' counsel in making medical purchases."); see also Schneider & Hall,
supra note 14, at 11 (extensively documenting the appropriateness of applying the consumer-based
model to health care and noting "few people shop for [medical care] like consumers, if only because of
insurance").
87. See, e.g., Jeff Kelly Lowenstein, Analysis Shows Widespread Discrepanciesin Staffing
Levels Reported by Nursing Homes, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/11/12/16246/analysis-shows-widespread-discrepancies-staffinglevels-reported-nursing-homes [http://perma.cc/9XL9-Y2HF] (noting the prevalence of nursing home
"reporting discrepancies," particularly that the staff levels reported to the Nursing Home Compare
website
were
"artificially
inflated");
Nursing Home
Compare, MEDICARE.GOv,
(last
[http://perma.cc/K65T-QH3A]
http://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/searclihtml
visited July 12, 2015) (rating nursing homes in locales throughout the United States, on health
inspections, staffing, quality measures, distance, and an overall rating). Nevertheless, the websites
have come under recent criticism; Physician Compare, MEDICARE.GOv, http://www.medicare.gov
/physiciancompare/search.html [http://perma.cc/3MGK-YRLN] (last visited July 12, 2015) (where
patients can access information regarding provider's quality reporting, educational background, and
various affiliations).
88. See, e.g., Isaac D. Buck, Overtreatmentand Informed Consent: A Fraud-BasedSolution to
Unwanted and Unnecessary Care, 43 FLA. ST. L. REv., at *30-31 (forthcoming 2016) (on file with
author).
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complicating factors 89 to provide satisfactory consumer-based answers. And
consumer-based solutions fall particularly flat when applied to Medicare
beneficiaries. 90 At a basic level, consumer-based answers "cannot sufficiently
rationalize medical care expenditures because boundedly rational consumers
cannot make the complex cost-benefit tradeoffs at the point of treatment that
the theory demands," 91 as Steven Brill shows.92
In a typical buyer-seller transaction, the seller owes the buyer no duty of
loyalty and few general duties. 93 It is not remarkable to state that, regarding
matters of money, buyers and sellers have opposite goals. The analogy breaks
down when applied to American health care. In fact, many of the patientprotective doctrines that have arisen and expanded over the last forty yearssuch as informed consent, patient autonomy and the right to refuse, and
medical malpractice enforcement-would be foreign to a typical buyer-seller
transaction. For example, few sellers outside of health care are required to
disclose information that could encourage the buyer to decide against a
purchase.9 4

89. See, e.g., JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 107 (noting that "health information is imperfect,"
patients are either "ill or under duress," and that "even when good information is available, patients too
often are passive consumers"); Hall & Schneider, supra note 20 (highlighting the problems with the
patient-as-consumer view).
90. The example in the Medicare context is even starker because the Medicare beneficiary
may not be paying monthly premiums-which would be different from an example of a privately
insured individual. See Medicare 2016 Costs at a Glance, MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/costs-at-a-glance/costs-at-glance.html
[http://perma.cc/PRC9-5ZVM] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016) ("Most people don't pay a monthly
premium for Part A (sometimes called 'premium-free Part A')."). But see Medicare Acute Care
Episode (ACE) Demonstration, CMS.GOv (May 29, 2015), https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/ACE
[http://perma.cc/R6UA-SPXJ] (describing a demonstration that sought to "test the effect that
transparent price and quality information has on beneficiary choice for select inpatient care").
91. See Korobkin, supra note 18, at 528.
92. See Brill, supra note 1.
93. See, e.g., Kathleen McNamara Tomcho, CommercialReal Estate Buyer Beware: Sellers
May Have the Right to Remain Silent, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1571, 1571 (1997) ("Caveat emptor, qui
ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emit-'let a purchaser, who ought not be ignorant of the amount
and nature of the interest which he is about to buy, exercise proper caution.' Caveat emptor, 'let the
buyer beware,' puts a purchaser on notice to 'examine, judge, and test for himself.' The doctrine

places the risk of hidden defects solely on the buyer when parties bargain at arm's length.").
94. Indeed, other relationships could be analogous to the doctor-patient-payer relationship.
Academics have compared the provider-patient enterprise to the mechanic-car owner relationship. See,
e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection ofFree Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraintson
Lawyers' FirstAmendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 580 (1998) (noting that "information
asymmetry creates moral hazards (such as the incentive to lie about the gravity of a problem) for auto
mechanics"). This relationship has been cited by scholars due to the presence of information
asymmetry, which also undeniably exists in the health care context. See Abigail R. Moncrief, The
IndividualMandate as HealthcareRegulation: What the Obama AdministrationShould Have Said in
NFIB v. Sebelius, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 539, 556 (2013).
The "mechanic" relationship is one between a payer-consumer and provider wherein the
provider has a monopoly on the expertise available. The consumer trusts the mechanic, just as the
patient trusts the provider. Further, the mechanic has information that the consumer cannot know-or
is too expensive for the consumer to know-about the status of the consumer's vehicle. With the
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Patients are at a substantial information deficit when visiting the hospital
or doctor. Unlike a typical buyer, the patient cannot access information
available to the provider; 95 indeed, "[p]atients rely so much on their doctors
that their purchasing choices are severely constricted," which further strains the
consumer analogy. 96 Not only is the provider an expert and the patient not one,
but the relevant information is also difficult for the patient to attain, understand,
and use. 97 Patients are operating in a transaction in which they are nearly
completely unprotected, which gives providers more power. Hall and
Schneider note that the "[d]octors' 'monopoly' power is intensified by patients'
almost irredeemable ignorance about almost all of almost every transaction." 98
This reality of the clinical relationship seems unlikely to change because
patients are not typical consumers.
In addition to these bedrock concerns, other characteristics-including
Medicare's historical shortcomings, the uniqueness of health care as a good,
and proxy and agency problems between patients and payers-complicate the
consumer-based paradigm that animates many of the recent policy changes in
American health care.
A.

Medicare's StructuralShortcomings

The consequences of Medicare's financing structure illustrate the poor fit
between consumer-based tools and health care. In particular, this structure
affects Medicare's four main constituents: patients, CMS, participating
providers, and taxpayers. Understanding how these parties receive, regulate,
administer, and pay for care within Medicare spotlights the deficiencies
inherent in the consumer-based model of American health care.
Most
significantly,
insured
patients-particularly
Medicare
beneficiaries-are generally free from typical economic pressures that affect
buyers in other consumer contexts. Medicare beneficiaries enjoy generous
coverage for procedures that are "reasonable and necessary." 99 And most
Medicare beneficiaries pay a fraction of the overall cost of their health care.10

knowledge deficit, it may be easy for the mechanic to convince the consumer to purchase additional
services to ensure the optimum performance of his vehicle.
Nevertheless, the mechanic may also be recommending a higher-priced upgrade because
he stands to gain financially when and if the consumer heeds his recommendation. This concern is also
present in the provider-patient relationship. Although the mechanic-car owner relationship may feature
less information asymmetry than the provider-payer relationship does--the car owner may be able to
utilize other sources to "check" the truthfulness or wisdom of the mechanic's recommendations, unlike
in health care-it still bears similarities in major characteristics. See Moncrief, supra.
95. See Moncrief, supra note 94.
96. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 20, at 652.
97. Id. at 645.
98. Id. at 653.
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2012) (the "reasonable and necessary" requirement); Health
Insurance Claim Form, supra note 83 (certification language); see also Medicare Billing: 837P and
Form CMS-1500, supra note 83 ("Medicare payment requires that an item or service ... [i]s
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Thus, from a financial perspective, Medicare beneficiaries often have no
incentive to avoid expensive or unnecessary surgeries-unlike patients who
must pay for costs incurred. 10 1 Stories like Brill's are indicative of the major
differences between health care and every other consumer good; consumer
protections in other industries do not translate to health care.10 2 The absence of
these pressures in the health care enterprise is undoubtedly liberating for the
patient and the provider, but leaves a regulatory gap where providers' selfinterest can encroach. 0 3
Patients also may lack the capacity to ask the right questions. Even when
a patient will be financially responsible for a hefty portion of the final hospital
bill, she is unlikely to question whether she has been adequately informed of,
for example, treatment alternatives, the necessity of an additional scan, or the
price of aspirin that she needs in the moment she is experiencing a health care
emergency. She, like Brill, is thinking about the pain or experiencing the fear
and uncertainty that often accompany a malady. In that moment, the Medicare
beneficiary is a patient, not a health care economist-or even a taxpayer who
funds Medicare. This creates an environment where the potential for
overtreatment-via a physician ordering tests that border on clinically
unnecessary or undertaking surgeries that may or may not be clinically
defensible'--is pronounced.

reasonable and necessary."); Local Coverage Determination (LCD): Services That Are Not
Reasonable and
Necessary
(L31686), NovrrAs
SOLUTIONS,
http://www.novitassolutions.com/LCDSearchResults/faces/spaces/search/page/Icdcjspx?Jurisdiction=JH&medicareType=
Part+B&_afrWindowMode=0&lcdlD=L31686&_afrLoop=352053925267000&State=Texas&_adf.ct
rl-state=12mugdtfr2_4 [http://permacc/8NAH-SJQT] (last visited Jan. 26, 2016) (providing an
example of various services, through a local coverage determination, that Medicare will likely
conclude are not reasonable or necessary).
100. See Brill, supra note 5 (comparing the cost breakdown for health care services for
Medicare beneficiaries to those for either uninsured or privately insured individuals).
101. See Korobkin, supra note 18, at 538 ("[P]atients are more conservative about seeking
medical care when they are forced to spend their own dollars on that care.").
102. For example, advertisements for the "new" CVS Health remind American consumers that
"health is everything." See Our New Name, CVSHEALTH, http://cvshealth.com/newsroom
[http://perma.cc/R6JP-G6SG] (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).
103. JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 107; Korobkin, supra note 18, at 540 ("Evidence strongly
suggests that many patients would prefer for their physicians to make treatment decisions for them.").
104. Prominent examples of overtreatment include administering various scans for painincluding EEGs, CTs, and MRIs-without any other risks of a more serious problem, as well as stent
placement. See Gawande, supra note 8; Jordan Rau, Overused Medical Services Cost Medicare
Billions of Dollars, NPR (May 12, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014
/05/12/311897685/overused-medical-services-cost-medicare-billions-of-dollars [http://perma.cc/C9J78RBA] (noting the prevalence of "low-value" services in Medicare and concluding that 21.9 million
low-value treatments were administered in 2009).
Other examples include prescribing expensive brand-name drugs and administering
procedures on an inpatient basis when they could instead be administered on an outpatient basis. See
Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act to Target Overtreatment, 74
OHIo ST. L.J. 463 (2013) (highlighting the kyphoplasty initiative as an example of an enforcement
initiative focused on the decision to perform surgeries on an inpatient basis).
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Outside the Medicare program, additional deductibles, copays, and other
forms of cost-sharing have made insured patients more sensitive to costs, but
these reforms have been largely limited to private insurance plans.1 05 The lack
of cost pressure on Medicare beneficiaries reveals both a valuable strength
(Medicare patients pay less) and a structural vulnerability (Medicare providers
game the system). Unsurprisingly, this vulnerability can create damaging

conflicts of interest for Medicare providers. Legal efforts on the margins
seeking to bolster consumer-based tools do not adequately address this risk.1 06
In addition, CMS, the entity that oversees Medicare, has been hesitant to
impose any cost-based limits on the types of care reimbursable under
Medicare. 107 And now, the program rests on shaky financial footing with a
booming enrollment.1 08 As its finances became more precarious, CMS
continued to protect nearly unlimited provider autonomy and failed to install
public price controls that would have impacted clinical decision making over
the last few decades.1 09 Clearly, the consumer-based model cannot control
CMS's reimbursement scheme.
To be fair, as is the case for private insurance carriers, Medicare faces a
massive "information problem" in its attempt to fairly and accurately limit
coverage to the most effective clinical treatments." 0 Not only is it a challenge
to make coverage determinations for procedures ex ante,"' but "measures of
marginal effectiveness of competing interventions are dynamic": once one
treatment is deemed the most effective, another is ready to take its place.11 2
Finally, the National Coverage Determination (NCD) process for the
Medicare program is fraught with challenges-including a built-in bias for

105.

The reforms brought about by the ACA directly address the cost-sharing scheme for

private insurance plans. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PATIENT COST-SHARING UNDER THE

AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2012), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8303
.pdf [http://perma.cc/8PX3-3MUL].
106. These tools include informed consent, patient autonomy and the right to refuse treatment,
as well as civil litigation for malpractice. See Buck, supra note 88. However, informed consent
remains a rather weak tool. See JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 107 ("For example, studies have shown that
patients take little interest in the informed consent process."). But see Korobkin, supranote 18, at 53238 (documenting the complexities involved in medical decision making, including emotion, unclear
information, the novelty of decisions, and the sheer complexity of a decision about a patient's
treatment plan).
107. See Fox, supra note 15, at 18.
108.
See Projected Change in MedicareEnrollment, 2000-2050, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2013),
http://kff.org/medicare/slide/projected-change-in-medicare-enrollment-2000-2050
[http://perma.cc/WZ32-PB7E] (showing the Medicare enrollment topping 64 million by 2020, 81
million by 2030, and at nearly 89 million by 2040). In 2010, there were 47.7 million Medicare
beneficiaries. Id.
109. See Fox, supra note 15.
110. See Korobkin, supra note 18, at 550 ("[T]here is very little solid information about even
the basic effectiveness of most medical interventions-according to some estimates, there is scientific
evidence for the efficacy of less than half the treatments doctors recommend.").
111. Id.
112. Id. at 551.
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approving new coverage determinations, the complete avoidance of
considering cost during the determination process, and a lack of clear and
has led a
adequately publicized rules governing the procedure 1'3-and
prominent scholar to call the NCD process "political" and not scientifically
accurate." 4

Attempts to reform certain aspects of Medicare have had limited success.
ACA payment reforms, a reformed "doc fix" regime," 5 and new payment
models that reimburse based on cost and quality of care 1 16 are just now being
implemented, so it is unclear whether these models will help cut the
unnecessary use of health care resources."' Through Medicare Advantage
plans, CMS is also relying on third parties, such as recovery audit contractors
(RACs) and health maintenance organizations (HMOs), to try and limit cost
increases, to mixed results." 8
Finally, where the ACA could have infused common-sense costeffectiveness metrics into coverage decisions, it avoided that path. The ACA
created the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) to
"improve the quality and relevance of evidence available to help patients,
caregivers, clinicians, employers, insurers, and policy makers make informed
health decisions,""1 9 but prohibited use of any of PCORI's findings "as
mandates for practice guidelines, coverage recommendations, payment or
policy recommendations.""' PCORI, as a result, occupies a precarious and

113. See Buck, supra note 11, at 1280-81.
114. Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeal Procedures: Can
Process Meet the Challenge of New Medical Technology?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1461, 1500
(2003).
115. See Robert Pear, Senate Approves a Bill on Changes to Medicare, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/us/politics/senate-approves-a-bill-on-changes-to2015),
medicare.html [http://perma.cc/TQ2X-8G8W] (describing the new reimbursement system as
"payment based on the quality and value of care, rather than just the volume of services"). Federal
officials have referred to the new framework as "not ... a permanent solution" and have warned that
the new system reduces payment for physicians in the Medicare program. Id.
116. See Patrick H. Conway et al., CMS Initiativefor Hip and Knee Replacements Supports
Quality and Care Improvements for Medicare Beneficiaries, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/11/16/cms-initiative-for-hip-and-knee-replacements-supportsquality-and-care-improvements-for-medicare-beneficiaries [http://perma.cc/2Z7X-E2SC] (describing
CMS's new "Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model" as a "mandatory bundled
payment model" in certain regions, which makes the hospital "accountable for the cost and quality of
care furnished to ... patient[s undergoing these procedures] for 90 days").
117. See JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 97 (highlighting that even in more modem payment
structures, incentives for excessive treatment still exist).
118. See discussion and accompanying notes, infra Part IV.
119. See About Us, PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RES. INST. (Oct 6, 2014),
http://www.pcori.org/about-us [http://perma.cc/8NRP-9E7Z] (stating that its "mandate is to improve
the quality and relevance of evidence available to help patients, caregivers, clinicians, employers,
insurers, and policy makers make informed health decisions").
120. See Fred Schulte, Is Obamacare'sResearch Institute Worth the Billions?, NPR (Aug. 4,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/08/04/428164731/is-obamacares-researchinstitute-worth-the-billions [http://perma.cc/G48J-7UM6].
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unpopular position in American health care politics-angering both
conservatives and liberals.1 2 1
Given the current reimbursement rules, providers have gamed the system
where they can. 122 With more time constraints, 123 lower reimbursement rates,1 24

and a growing number of specialists and referrals,125 providers administer
unnecessary services that directly result in higher costs.1 2 6 Under traditional
reimbursement models, financial incentives are also powerful drivers of
overtreatment. If a provider wants to make more money, he can perform more
scans, stents, or tests-increasing the amount of "no-value care" he
administers. 127
Other obvious incentives in the health care system seem designed to cause
overtreatment and underutilization. For instance, through its reimbursement
mechanism, Medicare financially incentivizes doctors to prescribe expensive
medications like Lucentis.1 28 The policy also encourages providers to treat
more patients and forces them to reduce the amount of time they spend with
each patient, ultimately leading to more (often unnecessary) testing and
scanning of those patients.1 29 Providers try to replace face-to-face time with an
extra scan, but "[t]here is no more wasteful entity in medicine than a rushed (or
incompetent) doctor."1 30 The consequences-excessive and expensive scans
and medications-are predictable. But CMS has not done enough, or done it
quickly enough, to fix this delivery system.
In addition, the hospital or health group often controls the price of health
care, with few limits. 131 Where a seller powerfully controls the market, 3 2 he
can charge the buyer as much as he wants-especially when the buyer is in

121. See id.
122. See JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 97 ("Overtesting and overconsultation have become facts of
the medical profession. The culture today is to grab patients and generate volume.").
123. Id. at 225-26 (noting that slashed reimbursement rates increase pressure to see more
patients, and that "[a]part from the perverse incentives of our fee-for-service system, a major driver of
overconsultation is the uncertainty engendered by the hurried pace of contemporary medicine").
124. Id. at 96.
125. Id. at 97.
126. See, e.g., id. at 94 ("In our health care system, if you have a slew of physicians and a
willing patient, almost any sort of terrible excess can occur.").
127. See Gawande, supra note 8.
128. See discussion and accompanying notes, supra Part I.
129. See JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 54 ("Technology like MRI scans and nuclear imaging rules
the day, permitting diagnosis at a distance. Many doctors don't even carry a stethoscope anymore.").
130. Id. at 226.
131. See Brown, supra note 33, at 14 ("Hospital prices are characterized by mind-boggling
complexity, opacity, unfair and inefficient price discrimination, and wide variations... . Not only do
different hospitals charge vastly different prices for the same service, but the same hospital charges
different prices to different payers.").
132. See Brill, supra note 5 (noting the weaknesses of the American patient, or consumer of
health services, at the time of most need).
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pain or under stress, as is the case in the medical industry. 133 Alone, no number
of consumer-based tools will rationalize hospital and physician prices.
Lastly, although taxpayers fund Medicare, 134 few legal solutions have
proposed increasing the taxpayer's involvement-perhaps because CMS is
viewed as a proxy for the millions of Medicare payers. Those funding the
program have an undeniable interest in limiting waste within the Medicare
program 135 to safeguard its financial viability, but they have limited tools to do
so. CMS's failure to adequately incorporate cost-effectiveness into coverage
decisions and reimbursement policies demands a new solution.
B.

The Uniqueness ofHealth Care Goods

In addition to the complications from pain, 136 lack of price pressure, and
information asymmetry, Professor Mark Hall has highlighted that medical
patients are seeking something different than buyers in other contexts. 137
Indeed, "[s]omeone who is ill and seeking help-unlike someone who is
purchasing a pair of socks or a pound of sausages-is often vulnerable,
certainly worried, sometimes uncomfortable, and frequently frightened." 13 8 In
this way, health care is unlike any other consumer good.
It is also more personal than other consumer goods. A health care
purchase is more individual than a purchase in just about any other industry;
each patient's treatment is unique. If a patient reads that too many cardiac
stents are being placed in patients in her locale, but her provider informs her
that she really needs one because her cardiac disease is severe, the patient will
likely agree. Sure, providers may be overly aggressive in placing stents in
others, but she really needs one. These tensions also make it a challenge to craft
utilization limits that are dependent on patients.
Health care needs persist even when one's health improves or changes.
Whereas buying a new refrigerator satiates the consumer's need, receiving
health care does not necessarily satiate the patient. For example, an annual
physical is considered a necessity, people may gain muscle or lose weight, and
preventive treatment is clearly acceptable. 139 If a consumer is interested in

&

133. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 20, at 652 (characterizing the doctors' power over
patients as a "monopoly").
134. See How Is MedicareFunded?, supra note 19.
135. See Mary Ann Baily, Futility, Autonomy, and Cost in End-of-Life Care, 39 J.L. MED.
ETHICS 172, 175 (2011) (arguing that "the people who pay the premiums and taxes that support
private and public insurance" should have their autonomy considered).
136. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 20, at 650-51 (noting that illness, inter alia, "disables,"
"pains," "exhausts," "erodes control," "enforces dependence," "disorients," "baffles," "terrifies," and
"isolates").
137. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 21 (documenting the importance of trust in the clinical
relationship).
138. Hall & Schneider, supra note 20, at 651.
139. See, e.g., Beatriz Solis, Statewide Support Suggests Now Is Time for Health Care for All:
Guest Commentary, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.dailynews.com
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purchasing a product that he can always use more of, does not pay (much) for,
and that his personal expert provider recommends, nothing dissuades that
consumer from agreeing to that purchase.
The individualism inherent to health care also limits regulators.
Individualized health care complicates the regulatory scheme by making it
more difficult to initially discern that financial harm has occurred and to
convince the patient that they have received overtreatment. For a regulatory
regime to have popular backing to adequately provide redress, the harmed party
has to actually know that she was harmed. Fraud and abuse laws help address
fraudulent billing schemes, but the financial harm of excess-the "grey" harm
to Medicare caused by American overtreatment-is diffuse. It is not borne by
one taxpayer, but spread among all of them. 4 0 Like an oil spill leaking into a
remote body of water, Medicare's chronic overtreatment problem directly
devastates very few individuals. Taxpayers may be pained by the problem
when they see it, but they may not feel it. And when the Medicare program is
overcharged, taxpayers may get squeezed, but patients (typically) do not die. In
short, few victims of the enterprise are clamoring for immediate recompense.
C. Agency and Proxy Problems
A final major challenge associated with the attempt to regulate Medicare
utilization is the agency problem. The one party interested in limiting costs and
utilization-the taxpayer-has no true agent in the hospital room. In some
instances, the provider's interests may be in direct conflict with the taxpayer's,
while the patient cannot be a good agent for the taxpayer. In the clinical setting,
the patient's needs easily subvert the taxpayer's desires.1 4 Patients like Steven
Brill happily craft a narrative that the provider is thorough, caring, heroic,
altruistic, and aggressive, 42 as long as the provider is healing him.
Without an individual with a vested interest in limiting overtreatment
present in each hospital room, the payer's power is blunted, if not vanquished.
/opinion/20141027/statewide-support-suggests-now-is-time-for-health-care-for-all-guest-commentary
[http://perma.cc/TG4P-FQPX] (noting that "[p]reventive care is a growing social issue" and that "even
among California's conservative voters, 64 percent agree that expanding access to preventive care is a
policy they can support'); Poll: American Public Supports Investment in Prevention as Partof Health
Care Reform, TRUST FOR AM.'S HEALTH (Nov. 2009), http://healthyamericans.org
/report/70/prevention-survey-II [http://perma.cc/LJ7K-ZDW7] (citing a Trust for America's Health
and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation survey finding "71 percent of Americans favor an increased
investment in disease prevention").
140. See David Lazarus, Fraud, Waste, and Absurd Charges a Drag on Medicare, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus-20141107-column.html [http://perna.cc
/R865-4RST] (reciting various fraudulent and incorrect Medicare reimbursement events); Cynthia
McFadden & Almin Karamehmedovic, Medicare Fraud Costs Taxpayers More Than $60 Billion
Each
Year,
ABC NEWS NIGHTLINE (Mar.
17, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com
/Nightline/medicare-fraud-costs-taxpayers-60-billion-year/story?id=10126555 [http://perma.cc/Z9LR3JZ8] (recounting investigation findings that Medicare fraud costs taxpayers $60 billion).
141. See Brill, supra note 1, at 38.
142. See id.
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In the clinical setting, the taxpayer has no direct interaction with the provider;
the taxpayer interacts with the provider only through Medicare reimbursement
policies and NCDs. CMS's influence on the provider seems obvious: through
extensive payment regulations and requirements, Medicare appears to
appropriately constrict the provider's treatment options to cost-effective
options. But in many clinical scenarios, the provider retains unlimited
discretion to choose among options that range in cost-effectiveness.
Most important, the provider retains nearly unlimited control over how
particular patients are treated. For instance, Medicare's reimbursement
regulations are not granular enough to only pay for lower back x-rays for
patients who truly need them. 143 Without an agent, Medicare cannot
differentiate these doctors from providers who perform unnecessary x-rays
because they are being aggressive, safe, or crooked, or lack time to converse
with the patient.144
If little binds the patient-provider enterprise and the payer, the payer
possesses little influence over the moment when the provider and patient
determine a treatment plan. The combination of the payer's weakness and
CMS's inaction with the problems inherent in relying on patients to limit
overtreatment makes clear that without a limiting force in the clinical decisionmaking process, overtreatment proliferates.

Indeed, few would argue that it is bad when patients feel empowered,
unencumbered by government rationing, and able to elect what they feel is
truly best for them. 145 But concluding that the beneficiary and provider should
enjoy a decision-making capacity that binds the payer to fund the chosen
service does not mean that the provider should enjoy unlimited discretion.
Perhaps the solution is not imposing new reimbursement regulations, but
instead, a regime shift that recognizes a flexible new legal relationship between
providers and payers.

D. Duct Tape: Ethics and Encouragement
Outside of fraud and abuse enforcement, which are difficult to
appropriately apply to overtreatment, 146 Medicare policy has largely punted on
the utilization question, leaving cost-effectiveness to physician ethics codes.
Aside from these ethics codes and Medicare reimbursement guidelines that
feature the vague requirement that all administered care be "reasonable and
143. In fact, Medicare's most limiting regulation-that all care must be reasonable and
necessary-features standards that are vague and broad. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2012).
144. See JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 97.
145. See Baily, supra note 135, at 175 ("Although reasonable limits on care are in the long run
interest of patients, in the short run, patients do not like to be told no. Moreover, the general public
does not really understand the need for limits. It does not understand that access to beneficial care is
already limited in a myriad of hidden ways that are anything but fair and reasonable. So, the general
public fears anything that can be given the label of 'rationing.').
146. See, e.g., Buck, supra note 88.
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necessary," 14 7 the provider's discretion over clinical decisions has been largely
unregulated and untouchable. 148 More recently, specialty groups have tried to
inform providers of the most routinely overused procedures and tests,1 49 but
these modern moves have failed to overcome a physician culture that has been
"notoriously resistant to cost-effectiveness principles or, more generally, to
serving the collective needs of the community as a whole at the expense of
identifiable individuals." 15 0 There are three main reasons for this.
First, this quasi-regulatory environment, which relies on ethics codes to
keep doctors from practicing profit-padding overtreatment, puts doctors in the
middle of an inexorable conflict. Historically, Medicare's reimbursement
policy pushed them to administer more health care to make money, but their
aspirational ethical tenets have ignored these realities. Physician ethics codes
speak from a time when medicine was simpler, patient-centered, and focused
on avoiding physical harm. 151 And without legal enforcement of these ethical
tenets, the profit motive may weaken the power of the physicians' codes of
ethics.
Second, the codes themselves lack explicit rules about overtreatment.
Physicians can easily argue that, when ordering the potentially unnecessary
lower-back screen, they were placing their patient first by simply being
"aggressive."1 52 Nothing in that situation is illegal or even unethical, but
administering unnecessary health care to patients is harmful to both patients
and taxpayers.

Physicians'

clinical

discretion

and expertise

provide

a

problematic cover for this harm.
Finally, the ethics codes do not even mention the payer. Cost has become
an unmentionable in American hospitals and clinics, as if the health care
enterprise is somehow above its moneymaking goals. 153 This phenomenon has
filtered down to the provider. In some ways, the physician operates in a
vacuum, concerned only about treatment and the patient. For instance, the
payer is not mentioned in the American Medical Association Code of Ethics

147. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a).
148. See Mantel, supra note 30, at 127 ("Medicare's design affords physicians unfettered
discretion over the medical care provided to their patients. This discretion allows physicians to exert
tremendous influence over how much Medicare spends on patient care.").
149. See, e.g., CHOOSING WISELY, http://www.choosingwisely.org [http://perma.cc/LN4QQSFR] (last visited July 20, 2015) (stating that organization's goal is "advancing a national dialogue
on avoiding wasteful or unnecessary medical tests, treatments and procedures" based upon evidencebased medicine).
150. Korobkin, supranote 18, at 544-45.
151. See generally American MedicalAssociation Code of Medical Ethics, AM. MED. AsS'N
(June 1994), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion605.page? [http://perma.cc/QNK6-VHW9].
152. See, e.g., Buck, supra note 11, at 1292-97 (documenting a recent enforcement action
against practitioners who adopted aggressive clinical strategies).
153. See Brill, supra note 1 (demonstrating the rude awakening for many patients when, upon
recovery and discharge, they realize that everything in a hospital comes with a price tag); see also
Hall, supra note 21 (claiming that if medicine discussed money, it would cheapen the profession).
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(Code). 154 The closest the Code gets to explicitly mentioning cost is Opinion
6.05:
A physician should not charge or collect an illegal or excessive fee.
For example, an illegal fee occurs when a physician accepts an
assignment as full payment for services rendered to a Medicare patient
and then bills the patient for an additional amount. A fee is excessive
when after a review of the facts a person knowledgeable as to current
charges made by physicians would be left with a definite and firm
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.1 55
Nothing in the Code addresses when a provider should discuss cost with a
patient, or when-if at all-cost should factor into clinical decision making.
Regarding utilization, the codes remind physicians that they "should not
provide, prescribe, or seek compensation for medical services that they know
are unnecessary."1 56 But this provision bans health care fraud, rather than
encouraging providers to be conscientious stewards of health care resources.
Clearly, an industry unconcerned with cost may have trouble adopting a
successful consumer-based model.
III.
THE LAW OF THE FIDUCIARY

Application of the fiduciary paradigm to the provider-payer relationship
in Medicare shifts the analysis-and recognizes a duty of loyalty between
Medicare's providers and its payers-but does not provide specific regulatory
guidance or rules to govern that legal relationship. Indeed, "fiduciary law does
not consist of an integrated body of concrete rules or precise doctrine that
applies uniformly to all forms of fiduciary relationships." 157 Nevertheless,
throughout disparate enterprises, central tenets govern the application of the
fiduciary relationship. A summary of these characteristics follows.
A.

GeneralApplicability

A number of general characteristics typically define recognized fiduciary
relationships. According to Professor Tamar Frankel, these are: (1) fiduciary
relationships are usually service relationships; (2) fiduciaries themselves are
entrusted with power; (3) the fiduciary's goal is to serve the entrustor, or
principal; (4) the relationship features excessive monitoring costs; (5) the

154. See American Medical Association Code ofMedical Ethics, supra note 151.
155. Opinion 6.05-Feesfor Medical Services, AM. MED. ASs'N (June 1994), http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion605.page?
[http://perma.cc/W4SB-9DP3].
156. Opinion 2.19-Unnecessary Medical Services, AM. MED. ASS'N (Dec. 2003),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion219.page? [http://perma.cc/CYP9-SHEB].
157. Hall, supra note 21, at 490.
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relationship features services for which the entrustor1 58 has little comparative
expertise; and (6) other external controls are too weak.' 59
Fiduciary law is vital to relationships that require something extra from
the law; it can "replace social controls that have weakened."1 60 The theory is
appropriate for an increasingly specialized workforce where "pooling," or the
"transfer of resources by many persons to a small number of experts,"
occurs.161 Pooling is efficient for society, but nakedly exposes the consumerentrustor's great weakness. 162
Put another way, a fiduciary relationship is appropriate when the fiduciary
is more expert than the entrusting party, when the entrusting party "wish[es] to
be relieved from performing the activities personally," or when the entrustor
"may not want to give up the time or make the commitment that the activity
requires."1 63 Not all relationships that feature one or more fiduciary
characteristics are recognized as a fiduciary relationship; indeed, the existence
of one or two fiduciary characteristics does not transform a fundamentally
nonfiduciary relationship into a fiduciary one.164 Nevertheless, the distinctions
are quite blurry.
According to Frankel, substitution and enabling are the two central
features of the fiduciary relationship.1 65 The fiduciary both serves as a
substitute for the entrustor1 66 and "obtains power from the entrustor or from a
third party for the sole purpose of enabling the fiduciary to act effectively." 167
Substitution and enabling give rise to the "central problem" of the
fiduciary relationship-the potential for the abuse of power by the fiduciary. 168
The entrustor is at risk of injury should the fiduciary misuse his power;
however, should the entrustor either reduce the power granted to the fiduciary
or increase monitoring or control of the fiduciary, or both, the entrustor
"reduce[s] the benefit expected from the relation." 169 In other words, the
delegation of power and substitution bestowed on the fiduciary are what make

158. The entrusting party is the principal, or the party for whom the fiduciary acts and to whom
he owes a duty.
159. Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryDuties, in THE NEW PALGRAvE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 127-28 (Peter Newman ed., 1998), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/trusting/unit5all.html
[http://perma.cc/FVP7-VRVT].
160. Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CALF. L. REV. 795, 802-03 (1983) (referencing the
changing societal norms between minors and masters, and the need for fiduciary duties to replace the
"lost controls").
161. Id. at 804.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 808.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 809.
166. Id. at 808.
167. Id. at 809.

168.
169.

Id.
Id.
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the fiduciary relationship so beneficial for the entrustor, and the entrustor loses
that benefit if he has to monitor the fiduciary.
Others refer to this as the "central agency problem." Professor Robert
Sitkoff has argued that the "agency problem arises whenever one person, the
principal, engages another person, the agent, to undertake imperfectly
observable discretionary actions that affect the welfare of the principal."1 7 0
Further, according to Sitkoff:
Agency problems are pervasive because no one has the skills
necessary to do everything for himself and because every undertaking
has an opportunity cost. By delegating a task to an agent, the principal
benefits from specialist service and is freed to undertake some other
activity. But these benefits come at the cost of being made vulnerable
to abuse if the agent is given discretion the exercise of which cannot
easily be observed or verified.1 7 1
As another scholar put it:
If contracting parties could provide rules to govern every potential
conflict of interest between them, then there would be no need for
fiduciary law. But often they can't. Courts enforce fiduciary duties
where one party hires the expertise of another, on the "obvious
condition" that she not be "at the mercy of an agent" she cannot
monitor.1 72

Because the fiduciary relationship provides protection from the agency
problem, scholars have applied this protection to an ever-expanding pool of
relationships.1 7 3
The agency problem also applies to the Medicare payer-provider
relationship. Medicare and its taxpayer funders have delegated to participating
providers the task of administering health care to its beneficiaries. But CMS,
the taxpayer's proxy, cannot be in every hospital room to ensure that every
stent placement is medically necessary. Regulating this relationship requires
stronger legal tools.

170. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 198 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); see also D.
Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REv. 671, 677 (2013) (proposing that
"political representatives should also be treated as fiduciaries, subject to a duty of loyalty" because of
agency problem present in governing).
171. Sitkoff, supra note 170, at 199.
172. Seth Davis, The False Promise ofFiduciaryGovernment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145,
1167 (2014).
173. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009) (friends);
Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REv. 699 (2013) (judges); Ethan J.
Leib et al., Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1109 (2014) (jurors and
juries); John Burritt McArthur, Restatement (First) of the Oipfield Operator's Fiduciary Duty, 45
NAT'L RESOURCES J. 587 (2005) (oilfield operators); Rave, supra note 170 (politicians); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401 (1995) (parents).
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The Patient-ProviderFiduciaryRelationship

The recognized fiduciary relationship in American health care-according
to both the academy and the courts-is the relationship between the provider
and the patient, 7 4 although this is up for debate.17 5 Indeed, the legal academy
has focused extensively on the relationship between the patient and provider,
with the debate centering on whether or not the fiduciary metaphor is a positive
and necessary development for patients, or a duplicative, harmful, trustreducing one.' 7 6 Professor Maxwell Mehlman, who supports the application of
the metaphor to the patient-provider relationship, argued that:
Fiduciary law protects patients and similar parties by providing them
with powerful procedural advantages compared with common law
plaintiffs. In effect, fiduciary law offsets a weaker interpersonal
position in the fiduciary relationship witsh a stronger legal position in
the event of a breach by the fiduciary.1 77
He further argued that although the fiduciary metaphor is under attack, the
relationship must remain entrenched in the patient-provider relationship,
particularly because "physician loyalty is essential for patient well-being."' 7 8
Professor Anna Laakman extended the fiduciary argument to physician
innovation. She proposed a fiduciary framework that requires physicians, when
innovating, to act in the best interests of their patients in a deliberative and
loyal way, but that protects the sanctity of the physician's substantive treatment
decision in a given clinical setting without exposing the physician to
liability.17 9
Although courts are not unanimous, many have held that the medical
provider is a fiduciary to patients,1 80 and the patient-provider relationship
174. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 20, at 678-79 ("Doctors have undoubted fiduciary duties
to their patients.").
175. See Maxwell J. Mehhman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciariesfor Their Patients, 12 IND.
HEALTH L. REv. 1, 10-12 (2015) (citations omitted) ("what does come as a surprise are the sources
that cast doubt on or reject outright the fiduciary nature of the patient-physician relationship. These
include judicial opinions as well as Restatements, legal treatises, scholarly articles and monographs.
Even the Supreme Court has muddied the waters.").
Mehhman also notes that three states have decided the patient-physician relationship is not
a fiduciary relationship. Id. at 22 (citing cases in Alabama, Delaware, and Minnesota).
176. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 21; Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59
VAND. L. REv. 1137 (2006).
177. Mehlman, supra note 176, at 1148; see also Hall & Schneider, supra note 20, at 668 ("The
law responds to patients' exceptional vulnerability by altering several assumptions about commercial
relationships. For example, the law spurns caveat emptor and the presumption that parties contract at
arm's length and instead makes the doctor a fiduciary."); Mehlman, supra note 175, at 17 ("The
reasons for denominating the patient-physician relationship as 'confidential' or one of 'trust and
confidence' rather than fiduciary are unclear.").
178. Mehlman, supra note 176, at 1172.
179. See Laakman, supra note 22.
180. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990)
(recognizing, in an informed consent context, that the physician has a "fiduciary duty to disclose all
information material to the patient's decision"); Estate of McRae, 522 So. 2d 731, 737 (Miss. 1988)
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seems to meet most, if not all, of Frankel's factors for a fiduciary
relationship. 18 1 Despite this, the actual application of fiduciary guidance to the
physician-patient relationship has been more complicated.18 2 Courts have
treated physicians as fiduciaries in scenarios involving "disclosure and
informed consent, patient confidences, and not withholding or fraudulently
concealing information patients or related third parties are entitled to
receive." 183 Further, "courts also have extended fiduciary law to protect the
vulnerable status of patients where physicians may exercise discretionary
power over them," 184 and have also imposed fiduciary duties on institutional
providers. 185 If not universal, recognition of the relationship is substantial.
In addition, Professors Hall and Schneider have observed that, like
regulation of health care delivery, the financial aspects of care would be served
well by a fiduciary analysis.186 They focus on overcharging the patient as the
evil in need of a remedy.
Doctors are fiduciaries because patients are medically at their mercy:

(recognizing a fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient); Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d
238, 242 (Nev. 1986) (noting that the physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary relationship "based
on trust and confidence"); Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 496 (Ariz. 1978) ("[T]he relationship
between a physician and his patient is one of trust and confidence which obligates the physician to
exercise the utmost good faith."); Otto v. Melman, 2009 WL 4348827, at *2 (N.Y. Dec. 2, 2009)
("[T]he physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one, based on trust and confidence and obligating
the physician to exercise good faith.") (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Mehhnan, supra
note 175, at 22 (listing the three states that have explicitly rejected the fiduciary metaphor for the
physician-patient relationship).
181. The Frankel factors apply to Medicare as follows. First, providers are administering a
service by providing health care to elderly patients. Second, participating doctors are entrusted with
power to administer medically necessary and reasonable health care services to those Medicare
beneficiaries. They are expected to use their expertise and abilities to administer care. Third, providers
have an ethical and legal duty to treat people who become patients. Fourth, the patient-provider
relationship features excessive monitoring costs. Providers determine what is medically necessary,
what prescriptions are appropriate, and whether or not to perform surgeries or scans. It is very difficult

for patients to understand whether a procedure was appropriate and successful, and the costs for
patients to monitor providers arc prohibitive. Fifth, patients have little comparative expertise. Sixth,
patients are often at the provider's mercy. The patient-provider relationship thus seems to squarely fit
within the fiduciary metaphor.
182. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their
Physicians, 55 U. PriT. L. REv. 291, 348-49 (1994) (stating that "[t]here has been little judicial
analysis of the appropriateness of applying fiduciary based disclosure obligations to the physicianpatient relationship," but noting that "[s]everal treatises on fiduciary law name the physician-patient
relationship as a fiduciary one and the courts have tended to concur") (citations omitted); Thomas L.
Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician's Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an Emergent
Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1167, 1167 (2009) ("Courts and commentators have
widely acknowledged that [the fiduciary] duty exists because of the nature of the special relationship
between a physician and patient. Application of this duty has been sparse, however, in part because its
jurisprudential foundation has received virtually no attention.").
183. Dayna Bowen Matthew, Implementing American Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary
Imperative, 59 BUFF. L. REv. 715, 727 (2011).
184. Id. at 728.
185. Id. at 729.
186. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 20, at 680-81.
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Unnegotiated, open-ended contracts make patients as vulnerable
financially as they are medically. Charging uninsured patients several
times more than patients protected by private insurers or government
regulators flagrantly exploits patients' financial, physical, and
psychological vulnerability. Fiduciary law is equipped with principles
which cry out for application in such circumstances. 187
But their work recognizes the potential for fiduciary application to the patientprovider relationship to protect the patient financially. The instant analysis
builds on that argument and suggests that a fiduciary duty relationship should
actually run from the provider to the ultimate payer-in this case, taxpayerfunded Medicare. In requiring the provider to owe duties of care and loyalty
not just to the patient but also to the payer, this analysis assumes that Hall and
Schneider's application of the fiduciary analysis to the patient's financial
wellbeing is correct. 188 This Article also argues that the fiduciary analysis
applies in situations where the patient is not financially responsible for
whatever amount the hospital seeks to charge, which is often the case for the
Medicare beneficiary.
IV.
PHYSICIANS AS FIDUCIARY STEWARDS

The central contribution of this proposal to recognize a payer-provider
fiduciary relationship is to impose on providers a duty of loyalty to Medicare's
payers. In the fiduciary relationship, the agent must satisfy a primary duty of
loyalty. 189 An action for breach of fiduciary duty does not require proof that the
provider breached a due care standard,1 90 but centers on whether the agent was
self-interested. The duty of loyalty "proscribes misappropriation and regulates
conflicts of interest by requiring the fiduciary to act in the 'best' or even 'sole'
interests of the principal,"191 whereas the duty of care is an "objective"

187. Id. at 681.
188. Id. (presenting supervisory doctrines as tools courts can use to protect patients and address
their vulnerability).
189. See Mehlman, supra note 177, at 27 ("Of course, a claim that a physician breached a
fiduciary duty is not the same as a claim that the physician committed medical malpractice. The
former deals with whether or not the physician acted loyally, while the latter deals with whether the
physician acted with due care.").
190. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of
Physicians to "Just Say No" if an "Informed" Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically
Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REv. 335, 379-80 (2009) ("An action for breach of fiduciary duty,
however, does not require the patient to demonstrate that the physician failed to exercise due care.
Instead, the plaintiff need only show that the physician's conduct violated basic rules of conduct
regarding how all physicians are expected to act, for which expert testimony may not be required.").
191. Sitkoff, supra note 170, at 201. Indeed, where a fiduciary is in structural conflict with his
beneficiary, he will not be held to account under fiduciary law unless he acts in accord with his own
interests and to the detriment of his beneficiary. See Mehlman, supra note 175, at 21.
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standard, one "establishing a 'reasonableness' or 'prudence' standard that is
informed by industry norms and practices." 192
In the provider-payer relationship, the loyalty duty would require the
provider to be loyal to the best interests of taxpayers who fund Medicare. This
is not a novel concept. Others have called for a stewardship duty for
providers.1 93 Indeed:

Physicians and other individual and organizational providers of
treatment are the stewards of these funds and have a duty to use them
only for uses that are consistent with the understandings that underlie
the formation of the pools. Not doing so violates the autonomy of
those who have paid into them.1 94
But this paradigm has not yet taken hold in the law; thus this proposal seeks to
advance it. Moreover, current reform efforts are inadequate.
A.

The Inadequate Toolset

Upon recognizing its unsustainable financial footing, Medicare has begun
to adopt new cost-saving tools. 195 Increasingly, the program is using
accountable care organizations (ACOs), bundled payment regimes, Medicare
managed care programs, and RACs, to tackle excess utilization and cost. Still, a
regulatory gap remains.
The fiduciary duty solution would be yet another tool to strengthen
Medicare cost-containment efforts. For example, a new fiduciary duty would
supplement the "carrots" in the program's modernizing reimbursement regime
by reaching scenarios that are not captured by the new paradigm. Further, it
remains unknown whether those recent policy changes will achieve the
necessary cost savings.
In an effort to streamline and coordinate care, the ACA has incentivized
health groups, physicians, hospitals, and other providers to form coordinated
health delivery networks called ACOs,1 96 which share "financial and medical
responsibility for providing coordinated care to patients in hopes of limiting
unnecessary spending."1 97 Regulators hope that ACOs will usher in a new era
in health care delivery--one in which providers have a direct financial interest

192.
193.
194.

Sitkoff, supra note 170, at 202.
See Baily, supra note 135, at 175.
Id.

195.
See, e.g., HEALTH CARE ADVISORY BD., THE FIELD GUIDE TO MEDICARE PAYMENT
INNOVATION
(Nov. 2015), https://www.advisory.com/~/media/Advisory-com/Research/HCAB

/Resources/2015/Field-guide/31183_HCAB_NewField_Guide_IG.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZFP3MU62].
196. Are Medicare ACOs Working? Experts Disagree, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://khn.org/news/are-medicare-acos-working-experts-disagree [http://perma.cc/PKY8-BCVW].
197. Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept.
14, 2015), http://khn.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq [http://perma.cc/6RTR-9ATV].
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in providing more efficient care. 198 Years after they were called "unicorns"
because few patients had come into contact with ACOs, these new networks
have begun to proliferate. 19
Even though CMS has stated that ACOs "continue to improve the quality
of care for Medicare beneficiaries, while generating financial savings," 200 the
verdict on whether ACOs are saving money is mixed. 201 And while twenty
ACOs are enrolled in the so-called Pioneer ACO program and more than 330
Medicare ACOs are enrolled in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(MSSP), 202 long-term cost-savings forecasts remain unclear.2 03
The ACO model has also been subject to criticism. Many of the entities
able to take on the financial risk necessary to enroll in the ACO program are
large entities, or the types of large entities that "are still being reimbursed under
[a] traditional fee-for-service payment model," 2 04 which makes them much less
likely to try to control costs. 205 Others have criticized the accounting practices
employed by CMS, which seem to paint a picture rosier than the reality. 206 For
instance, a proposed change to the way CMS calculates whether ACOs in the
MSSP are saving the program money would result in increased findings of
savings. 207

198. See Are MedicareACOs Working?, supra note 196.
199. See Suzanne Delbanco & David Lansky, The Payment Reform Landscape: Accountable
Care Organizations,HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 5, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/08/05/thepayment-reform-landscape-accountable-care-organizations [http://perma.cc/A944-RJHQ].

200.

Medicare ACOs ProvideImproved Care While Slowing Cost Growth in 2014, CMS.GoV

(Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Factsheets-items/2015-08-25.html [http://perma.cc/9RB2-C6YY].
201. See Ken Alltucker, Medicare "Accountable Care" Reforms Bring Mixed Results, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Sept. 25, 2015), http://vwv.azcentral.com/story/moncy/business/conmumers/2015/09
/25/medicare-accountable-care-reforms-bring-mixedresults/72625180/?from=global&sessionKey=&autologin= [http://perna.cc/7PST-XETD] (describing
situation in Arizona, where Medicare saved over $2 million, but "[s]ix out of 10 Arizona health
systems participating in Medicare's 'accountable care' programs spent more money than Medicare
projected last year, and one program broke even"); Melanie Evans, Few Medicare ACOs Earned
Bonuses in 2014, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com
/article/20150825/NEWS/150829922 [http://perma.cc/FX3Q-A9YN].

202.

Medicare ACOs Provide Improved Care While Slowing Cost Growth in 2014, supra note

200.
203. See Are MedicareACOs Working?, supra note 196.
204. Id.
205. Id. Robert Murray, the president of Global Health Payment, continues:
For hospitals, which have high levels of fixed costs, the way to cover costs and earn profits
is to generate more volume. Their incentives run directly counter to the goals of the ACO
program, which are to reduce costs, to reduce unnecessary use of hospitals and high-priced
professionals. The ACO model for these groups is akin to asking an overweight patient to
eat his or her own flesh to become thinner. Id.

206.

Id.

207. See Virgil Dickson, CMS Proposes Changes to ACO Benchmarks, MOD. HEALTHCARE
(Jan.
28,
2016),
http://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20160128/NEWS/160129856?elq
_cid=1306202&x_id= [http://perma.cc/4D7H-Z4T6] (describing a recent CMS proposal that seeks "to
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Notwithstanding the challenges, many remain cautiously optimistic 2 08
regarding ACOs' abilities to save money.
Reviews of ACO programs' quality of care also offer mixed results. Some
experts note that entities participating in Medicare's ACO programs-which
remain strictly voluntary-have reportedly improved Medicare's care
quality. 209 But other analyses suggest that quality of care in the ACO program
was "weak" in 2014. According to a recent analysis of care quality, the "top
financial performers [in the program] did so poorly that none ranked in the top
90th percentile nationally." 2 10 These numbers have "raise[d] questions about
the accuracy of quality measures in the [ACO] program." 211
In addition to the unanswered quality and cost questions, there is a
concern that ACOs-particularly for private payers and not necessarily
Medicare-incentivize further consolidation in the health care marketplace. By
pushing coordination, ACOs may harm competition and lead to higher total
prices. Specifically, many in the industry are "joining forces and purchasing
physician practices, leaving fewer independent hospitals and doctors. Greater
market share gives these health systems more leverage in negotiations with
insurers, which can drive up health costs and limit patient choice." 212 Suffice it
to say that any conclusions about ACO effectiveness remain tentative.
In a second reform, CMS is seeking to change its Medicare
reimbursement regime from a fee-for-service model to reimbursement on the
basis of global, or bundled, payments. HHS Secretary Sylvia Burwell made
headlines in January 2015 when she asserted that Medicare would seek to pay
up to 50 percent through alternative reimbursement models (including bundled
payments) by 2018.213 This is an ambitious plan, but by March 2016, 30
percent of Medicare's reimbursements were made through alternative payment
models. 214

Achieving those goals requires agreeing on the definition of "value,"
ensuring an adequate amount of performance data and accounting metrics, and
assisting physicians with considerable administrative costs incurred by
move away from assessing ACO benchmarks based on historical spending, and instead analyze trends
in regional fee-for-service costs").
208. David Muhlestein, Medicare ACOs: Mixed Initial Results and Cautious Optimism,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 4, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/04/medicare-acos-mixedinitial-results-and-cautious-optimism [http://perma.cc/BS7H-H7PA].
209. See Are MedicareACOs Working?, supra note 196.
210. Melanie Evans, Medicare ACOs Lost $41 Million to Poor Quality Performance, MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(Oct.
16,
2015), http://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20151016/NEWS
/151019929 [http://perma.cc/ZFK5-YSKA].
211. Id.
212. See Gold, supra note 197.
213. See Better, Smarter, Healthier,supra note 16.
214. See HHS Reaches Goal of Tying 30 Percent of Medicare Payments to Quality Ahead of
Schedule, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS. (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/about
/news/2016/03/03/hhs reaches -goal-tying-30 percent medicare payments quality ahead schedule.html
[http://perma.cc/Q66R-7NKM].
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increased data reporting. 215 Bundled payments also face the classic threat that
"[a]lthough the cost of each bundle may be reduced"-that is, each care
episode for which Medicare will reimburse under a bundled payment method
may become more efficient-"without any control over the volume of bundles
provided, overall spending may not go down." 2 16 In theory, bundled payments
incentivize providers to limit the costs per bundle, but do not limit the number
of bundles of care that a provider administers.
In a third reform, Medicare has also adopted a traditional cost-saving tool
used in the private health care insurance industry. Through Medicare
Advantage, managed care has come to Medicare. As of 2015, more than 16
million people, or roughly 30 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries,2 were
enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans (or Medicare Part C). 218
Medicare Advantage allows private insurers to provide coverage for
Medicare beneficiaries. 219 Medicare Advantage "must cover all of the services
that Original Medicare covers except hospice care," but may also cover
additional benefits. 220 Like HMOs before them, these plans import a number of
cost-constraining techniques from the private insurance marketplace: referrals
to see specialists, approved networks, higher coinsurance or copayment
amounts for out-of-network services, and medical savings account options. 22 1
But Medicare managed care has faced many of the same criticisms as the
private insurance experience. The HMOs that offer Medicare Advantage plans
have come under increased scrutiny, with dozens fined in 2014.222 These
enforcement actions have exposed a "very long pattern of misbehavior of
215.

See John

HEALTH AFF.

O'Shea,

PhysicianPayment Reform in a Post-SGR World: ChallengesRemain,

BLOG (Sept. 3, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/09/03/physician-payment-

reform-in-a-post-sgr-world-challenges-remain [http://perma.cc/9M7J-3DLF].
216. Id. Under the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative, CMS has the authority
to design and implement payment bundling models. Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
Initiative, HEALTH AFF. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief pdfs
/healthpolicybrief_148.pdf [http://perma.cc/RSC7-GQ3A] ("CMS hopes that by paying for related
care as part of a broad payment bundle, different providers that treat a patient during a single episode
will have incentives to better coordinate care, avoid unnecessary services, and improve patient
health.").
217. See Bob Herman, Medicare Is Doing More to Police Advantage and Part D Lapses, but
Does It Matter?, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com
/article/20141204/NEWS/312049934 [http://perma.cc/GED3-FVHU].
218. See Medicare Advantage: Total Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2015),
http://kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/total-enrollment-2 [http://perma.cc/S2TY-8AY5] (noting that
16.3 million Americans-mostly residents of urban areas-were enrolled in Medicare Advantage
plans).
219. See What's a Medicare Advantage Plan?, MEDICARE.GOV
(Apr. 2015),
https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/l1474.pdf [http://perma.cc/C3CH-NZB4].
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See Herman, supra note 217 (noting that "insurance companies of all sizes are increasingly
finding themselves in similar situations with the government," and that "nearly three dozen health
insurance companies have faced ... fines ... or, worse, temporary suspension from enrolling or
marketing to new Medicare members").
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Medicare HMOs," 223 including, in one case, allegations of systemic failures
causing "inappropriate delays or denials in receiving covered benefits" that
allegedly resulted in "inappropriate delays in access to medications or not
receiving the appropriate appeal rights." 224 Recent lawsuits 2 25-including as
many as six alleging systematic overbilling by Medicare Advantage planshave focused attention on the adequacy of government oversight of these
plans. 226
In addition to these allegations, which mirror some of the criticisms of
HMOs in the 1990s and early 2000s, 227 Medicare HMO plans have not saved
money. To some extent, this is because Medicare Advantage plans' budgets are
linked to Medicare's spending. 228 As a result, the amounts spent on Medicare
Advantage plans rise with the cost of health care.
From a cost perspective, Medicare Advantage has been criticized as
"fall[ing] short of replicating a competitive market outcome," which prevents it
from being "fully cost-effective." 229 Until passage of the ACA, Medicare
Advantage plans were "receiving payments in excess of 114% of [fees for
services rendered]," resulting in dramatic overpayments. 23 0 Current cost results

223. Id.
224. Letter from Gerard J. Mulcahy to Mr. Matt Cowley (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Compliance-and-Audits/Part-C-and-Part-D-Compliance-andAudits/Downloads/Tenet-PhoenixCMPl10614.pdf [http://perma.cc/YR68-2PY8].
225. See Fred Schulte, Fraud Case Puts Spotlight on Medicare Advantage Plans, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/02/13/16755/fraud-case-putsspotlight-medicare-advantage-plans [http://perma.cc/PL5P-AKF7].
226. See Lisa Schencker, Grassley Presses CMS on Medicare Advantage Fraud, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (May 21, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150521/NEWS
/150529974 [http://perma.cc/X7H4-5RXU] (relating how U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley has
"implor[ed]" the Department of Justice and CMS to "take action"); Fred Schulte, McCaskill: Medicare
Advantage Billing Fraud "Must Be Investigated," CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 29, 2015),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/05/29/17422/mccasldll-medicare-advantage-billing-fraud-musthas acknowledged" that
be-investigated [http://penna.cc/2M2H-936R] (noting how "CMS ...
Medicare Advantage's "faulty risk scores remain a costly problem").
227. See, e.g., David R. Olnos, Ill, Elderly and Poor Fare Worse in HMOs, Study Says, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-10-02/news/mn-49641_1_poor-patients
[http://pemia.cc/7P6V-DG52] (reporting that the "comprehensive study ... found that nearly twice as
many elderly patients in HMOs said their health declined over a four-year period"); Ted Rohrlich,
Kaiser Made It Hard to See an MD, Critics Say, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2001),
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/0l/local/me-40958 [http://perma.cc/S327-EZ3G] (reporting that
California's largest HMO, Kaiser Permanente, sought to prevent its patients from seeing doctors).
228. Thomas L. Greaney, Medicare Advantage, Accountable Care Organizations, and
Traditional Medicare: Synchronization or Collision?, Speech at Health Law Workshop, Petrie-Flom
Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/assets/pubhcations/Greaney.pdf [http://perma.cc/4J6H-GAEY].
229. Thomas L. Greaney, Controlling Medicare Costs: Moving Beyond Inept Administered
Pricingand Ersatz Competition, 6 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 229, 239 (2013).
230. Id. at 240. Alleged fraud in the system has also presumably led to increased costs. See
Schencker, supra note 226 (noting that "OIG estimated that ... Medicare made $11.8 billion in
improper payments-$9.3 billion in overpayments and $2.6 billion in underpayments-because of
errors related to risk adjustment").
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of Medicare Advantage plans are "mixed," and HMOs may be "slightly more
efficient" 231 than traditional fee-for-service delivery. Overall, however,
Medicare
has
been
Advantage
"characterized
by
considerable
inconsistency."

232

Finally, Medicare's RACs 233 seek to investigate anomalies and waste
within the Medicare program. RACs are charged with "identify[ing] and
correct[ing] Medicare improper payments through the efficient detection and
collection of overpayments made on claims of health care services provided to
Medicare beneficiaries, and the identification of underpayments to
providers." 2 34 RACs utilize "post-payment" review, 235 which employ "data
mining and other analytical techniques to identify potentially improper claims
that lead them to focus on a small subset of submitted claims." 236 These entities
"are required to employ ... nurses, therapists, certified coders and a physician"
on staff.237 RACs are a relatively new creation started through a demonstration
project as part of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003.238
In that short lifespan, and not unlike other Medicare reforms, RACs have
faced criticism. Their investigations are burdensome for providers 239 and trade
associations and congressional reports have criticized their fee arrangements
and incentive structure. 240 The RAC "incentive structure is based on recovering
money that Medicare shouldn't have paid, rather than reducing improper

231.
232.

Greaney, supra note 229, at 243.
Id.

233.

See

Recovery

Audit

Program, CTRS.

FOR

MEDICARE

&

MEDICAID

SERVS.,

http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFSCompliance-Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program [http://perma.cc/S45X-RZ2R] (last visited July 21,

2015).
234.

Id.

235. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE RECOVERY AUDIT PROGRAM AND
MEDICARE: THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, How AND WHY? 6 (May 13, 2013),

https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFSCompliance-Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/The-Recovery-Audit-Program-andMedicare-Slides-051313.pdf[http://perma.cc/N3D9-LZGJ].
236. Mantel, supra note 30, at 130 n.43.
237.
THE RECOVERY AUDIT PROGRAM AND MEDICARE, supra note 235.
238.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE MEDICARE RECOVERY AUDIT
CONTRACTOR (RAC) PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION OF THE 3-YEAR DEMONSTRATION 4 (2008),

https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/monitoring-programs/recovery-auditprogram/downloads/racevaluationreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/F9L6-AVH6].
239. See Bob Herman, RACs Are Back, at Least Through 2015, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec. 31,
2014),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141231/NEWS/312319975
[http://perna.cc
/8GJV-3NPB]; see also Recovery Audit Contractor (RAC) Program, AM. HOSP. ASs'N,
http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/rac/index.shtml [http://perma.cc/X5UL-YS64] (last visited Mar.
9, 2016) (noting that RACs "subject hospitals to additional administrative burden and costly payment
denials" and that the American Hospital Association is working to "prevent abuses that preclude
hospitals from receiving payment for necessary medical care").
240. See Virgil Dickson, Medicare's Audit Contractors Are Failing, Say Lawmakers and
Hospitals, MOD. HEALTHCARE (July 9, 2014), http://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20l40709
/NEWS/307099939 [http://perma.cc/JH2C-8FEY].
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claims." 241 Because RACs are paid on a contingent-fee basis, 242 they are often
incentivized to appeal large claims, so appeals are severely backlogged. 243
Further, a recent report found that hospitals belonging to the American Hospital
Association were highly successful in winning appeals-achieving reversals in
more than 70 percent of appeals of inpatient claims denials. 244 RACs typically
keep around 10 percent of Medicare's recouped overpayments as profit.245
RACs have also recently endured withering criticism from Congress due
to the contractors' apparent ineffectiveness. 246 Nonetheless, CMS wants to use
RACs for Medicare Advantage plans-ironically to police and prevent
improper payments in those plans as a result of inflated risk scores. 247
Just like the HMO solution imported from the 1990s, the RAC solutionanother attempt to insert a third party with a profit motive into the enterprisedoes not appear to provide a satisfactory answer, particularly because providers
can claim that a government bureaucrat or nameless supervisor is driven not by
ensuring quality clinical care and medical necessity, but by maximizing profit.
The expert party is squeezed out, the regulatory body or third-party entity
comes "between you and your doctor," and, the narrative goes, patients and
providers are the worse for it. 248 This critique seems to follow any costcontainment solution that features a nonprovider third party.

241. Id.; see also Recovery Auditors / RACs, AM. MED. Ass'N, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practicecoding-bilinginsurance/medicare/recovery-audit-contractors.page? [http://perma.cc/KMM9-CTEH] (last visited Jan.
29, 2016) ("The AMA is opposed to the contingency fee structure of the RAC program, and has
advocated for numerous changes.").
242. See Bob Herman, CMS to Launch RACs for Medicare Advantage, MOD. HEALTHCARE
(Dec.
28,
2015),
http://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20151228/NEWS/151229937
[http://perma.cc/9WE3-AAEH].
243. Dickson, supra note 240.
244. Id.
245. See Herman, supranote 242.
246. See Dickson, supra note 240 (noting that Congress has been critical of RACs' lack of
effectiveness in reducing improper payments, even going so far to claim that RACs may have an
incentive to maintain a high rate of improper payments in the system to ensure continued profit).
247. See Herman, supranote 242.
248. Indeed, commentators have argued that preserving the freedom of the patient-physician
relationship and allowing the provider and patient to build trust is a vital characteristic of the healing
relationship. See Hall, supranote 21.
Americans do not trust bureaucrats to handle resourced-based health care decisions. See
Section-by-Section Review Reveals New Dangers in Democrats' Government Takeover,
SPEAKER.GOV (Aug. 16, 2009), http://www.speaker.gov/general/detailed-analysis-house-democratsbill-will-lead-rationing-health-care [http://perma.cc/69BL-2PAR] (noting that Americans "oppose
[the] scheme for a big-government takeover of health care that will raise costs, ration care, and put
bureaucrats in charge of decisions that should be made by patients and doctors"). According to The
Washington Post, former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin posted the following in response to the ACA:
The America I know and love is not one in which my parents or my baby with Down
Syndrome will have to stand in front of Obama's "death panel" so his bureaucrats can
decide, based on a subjective judgment of their "level of productivity in society," whether
they are worthy of health care. Such a system is downright evil.
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These Medicare cost-control tools-ACOs, bundled payments, Medicare
Advantage, the deployment of RACs, and even the recent reimbursement
changes proposed by CMS 249-may achieve cost savings, but the imposition of
a fiduciary relationship would bolster these efforts. The fiduciary duties would
reach those situations that ACO formation and bundled-payment efforts do
not-scenarios like the Avastin and Lucentis example. Further, early results
from the ACO program are mixed, and challenges remain in the move toward
bundled payments. Recognition of a fiduciary relationship avoids the critiques
lobbed at Medicare Advantage and RACs because it relies on the provider to
inculcate cost-containment efforts in her clinical practice and avoids installing
third parties between doctors and patients. Finally, CMS's new proposals may
blunt the incentives to rely on more expensive medications, but will likely not
eliminate them. 250
This proposal aligns with the argument that the provider can best
determine what procedures are not only medically necessary, but also the most
cost-effective. The fiduciary duty regime would serve as an additional or standalone way to curb unnecessary Medicare expenses. And it would undoubtedly
provide a much-needed limitation on Medicare's vague, overly broad
"reasonable and necessary" standard.2 51
B.

The Payer-ProviderFiduciaryRelationship

This analysis posits that Medicare's payer-provider relationship needs
fiduciary protection because the relationship matches the existing fiduciary
paradigm. The payer-provider relationship meets all six of Professor Frankel's
factors for a legally recognized fiduciary relationship:
"
The administration of health care is a service;
"

Participating physicians hold discretion and power;

"

Providers

"
"

"

aim to serve

the patient and payer (indeed,

Medicare is purchasing services from providers);
Oversight of physicians' medical necessity determinations and
clinical techniques is burdensome;
Payers and patients themselves lack expertise about
administering health care (which is why payers depend on
providers to administer services and bill for them); and
Other external controls on overtreatment are too weak. 252

Glenn Kessler, Sarah Palin, "Death Panels" and "Obamacare," WASH. POST (June 27, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/sarah-pain-death-panels-andobamacare/2012/06/27/gJQAysUP7Vjblog.html [http://perma.cc/S8A9-AUTP].
249. See discussion and accompanying notes, supra notes 65-70.
250. See discussion and accompanying note, supra note 70.
251. See discussion and accompanying note, supra note 99.
252. See Frankel, supra note 159, at 127-28.
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Beyond the argued-for "financial" fiduciary duty owed by the provider to
the patient, other policy reasons demonstrate that Medicare-the payer-needs
additional legal protections. These follow below.
1.

Extending the PresentFiduciaryRelationship

Extending fiduciary protection to Medicare would mark a natural
evolution and extension of the doctrine. As Professor Hall has highlighted,
courts have not yet imposed liability for a breach of fiduciary duty "based on
financial incentives, even though courts recognize the obvious force that
fiduciary principles have in doctor-patient relationships and that these
principles are generally hostile to financial conflicts of interest."25 3 But treating
physicians as financial fiduciaries to patients does not adequately solve the
overtreatment problem because it fails to protect the payer, the party truly
harmed by overtreatment. Patients may be unaware that they are receiving
excessive health care services, or agnostic about receiving them, or may even
desire them. 25 4 As Steven Brill's narrative shows, in some situations patients
are understandably quick to trust providers when they suggest more, or more
expensive, care.
Due to the pain and anxiety that often accompany a health emergency, the
patient might justifiably change the narrative: overtreatment becomes
thoroughness, excess becomes aggressiveness, and expense becomes necessary.
Should a patient have to choose between Avastin and Lucentis, he may not
have any interest in the relative costs of the drugs, or any duty (or even
ability) 255 to ask about cost. The patient may choose a particular drug because
she can take it only once a day, whereas she might need to take a cheaper drug
twice a day. However, in clinical scenarios where care is questionably
necessary, or where the clinical difference between two drugs or procedures is
nonexistent and the price differs substantially, the provider's fiduciary duties to
the payer should prevent the health care enterprise from sanctioning and paying
for unnecessary treatment. In these scenarios, the Medicare beneficiary's desire
for overtreatment cannot win the day.
In some clinical situations, the interests of the patient and the payer may
be diametrically opposed.256 The patient and physician may actually be aligned
in their desires, and the payer adverse. Limiting the provider's fiduciary duty to

253. Hall, supra note 21, at 504.
254. See Tara Parker-Pope, Overtreatment Is Taking a Harmful Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27,
[http://
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/overtreatment-is-taking-a-hannful-toll/
2012),
perma.cc/BK3D-N4GJ] (suggesting that "many patients and doctors believe" that "more is better").
255. See Brown, supra note 33 (analyzing price opacity generally).
256. For example, the wishes of a demanding patient are clearly in conflict with the interests of
the American taxpayer. See Hafemeister & Gulbrandsen, supra note 190; see also SHANNON
BROWNLEE, OvERTREATED: WHY TOO MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING Us SICKER AND POORER 15758 (2007) (noting of doctors that "when a patient demands a test, they often comply-even when they
know the test is not warranted"). See generally Baily, supra note 135.
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only the patient may solve some of the overtreatment problem by preventing
fraud or the knowing administration of excessive health care, but it does not
prevent the provider from choosing unnecessarily expensive treatment options.
To be fully effective in preventing overtreatment when choosing between
clinical options, the provider must have and satisfy a duty of loyalty to the
payer. A provider must be cognizant of the cost-effectiveness of certain
procedures and drugs, and not cede decision-making authority to a demanding
patient who wants to be overtreated.
Similarly, when the provider is a fiduciary to the patient, that the provider
may also be a fiduciary to the payer of the health services is a natural
conclusion. 257 The financial duties of care and loyalty that the provider owes to
the patient mirror the duties of care and loyalty that the provider should owe to
the payer. Given the state of overtreatment in American health care, this
extension of the financial duties would offer the payer a potential legal remedy
in cases of overtreatment. As Hall and Schneider have pointed out,
"unnegotiated, open-ended contracts make patients as vulnerable financially as
they are medically." 25 8 And patient financial vulnerability-at least in
Medicare-quickly becomes payer vulnerability, particularly because each
individual Medicare beneficiary is responsible for so little of his own health
care bill. 259
2.

Addressing Medicare's MonitoringProblems

The fiduciary relationship has been applied to the patient-provider
relationship because "sick people are singularly ill-situated to monitor the
exercise of medical discretion." 260 And without adequate monitoring, the
central threat to the relationship-self-dealing-must be countered by extra
protection. Like in other industries, "[s]elfishness-suppressing requirementsfiduciary obligation, duties of good faith, and other cooperation-favoring
principles-are the law's classic response to such monitoring problems." 261
Just as the patient cannot appropriately monitor the provider, Medicare's
monitoring failure may lead to overtreatment based on inefficient care.

257. Comparatively, patients already enjoy extensive legal protection. A patient harmed by a
provider can turn to medical malpractice litigation for recompense. But for a payer, few remedies-if
any-exist. Previous work on application of the fiduciary metaphor has dealt extensively with clinical
situations that harm the patient, but the availability of other remedies for the patient, like medical
malpractice, make the debate as to whether or not the provider-patient relationship is a fiduciary one
seem almost superfluous.
258. Hall & Schneider, supra note 20, at 681 (suggesting that fiduciary law should apply to the
costs that hospitals and physicians charge to patients).
259. See Brill, supra note 5.
260. M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REv. 919,
930 (2002).
261. Id. In a number of situations, relying on patient information and consent is not adequate to
protect the patient's wishes. See Mehiman, supra note 175, at 44-45.
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As others and I have argued,262 the structure and history of Medicare
make it uniquely unable to adequately contain its own costs. Most alarmingly,
Medicare cannot cut or limit coverage for expensive procedures or drugs based
solely on cost-effectiveness grounds.263 This has generated frequent criticism of
its coverage determination process. 2" Further, Medicare often serves as a
lightning rod for political debate and attention, and any attempts to make the
program more cost-effective or to limit coverage draw fierce political
opposition. 265
Medicare also suffers from the same challenges as the health care
enterprise more generally. Specifically, government officials implementing the
reimbursement regulations may lack the expertise and information possessed
by individual providers. In fiduciary terms, the difference in skill level between
the principal (Medicare) and its agent (the provider) is problematic. This "skill
deficit that prompted the principal to engage the agent renders the principal
vulnerable to abuse by limiting the principal's ability to monitor the agent." 266
Medicare lacks the dexterity, foresight, and resources to adequately police its
participating providers in a way that eliminates or neutralizes the overtreatment

threat. Some of these challenges are endemic to the insurance industry
generally, and others seem to have been created by Medicare itself.267
3.

Neutralizing the Threat of Self-Dealing

In addition to its inability to monitor providers, Medicare is threatened by
provider self-dealing. Although alternative reimbursement mechanisms seek to
reform the system, Medicare still links a substantial portion of its
reimbursements to providers to the amount of services or drugs-or the
expense of those services or drugs-that they provide. 268 Without an adequate
counterweight, even the most honest and well-meaning providers are enticed to
prescribe and administer increasingly expensive drugs and procedures.

However, the problem is too entrenched for a change to only the
reimbursement structure to solve it. As Sandeep Jauhar argued in his book
Doctored, if Medicare and regulators generate a new reimbursement
mechanism that limits some overtreatment, providers will find a new way to
increase their profits based on existing loopholes. 269 From his perspective, the

262. See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn't Worked, 101
GEO. L.J. 519 (2013); see also Buck, supra note 11, at 1270-82; Fox, supra note 15.
263. See also Buck, supra note 11, at 1270-82; Fox, supra note 15. See generally Bagley,
supra note 262.
264. Kinney, supra note 114, at 1500.
265. See Buck, supra note 11, at 1270-82.
266. Sitkoff, supra note 170, at 199.
267. See discussion and accompanying note, supra note 262. Indeed, Medicare is working to try
and reverse providers' incentives. See HEALTH CARE ADVISORY BD., supra note 195.
268. See discussion and accompanying notes, supra Part I.A.
269. See JAUHAR, supra note 7, at 96-97.
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problem is trust: payers need a legal paradigm that demands and expects trust
from its providers. Simply changing reimbursement policies may fall short, so
a fiduciary solution focused on addressing this trust gulf seems particularly
appropriate.
4.

A Flexible Theoryfor Unforeseen Contingencies

Because the enrollment agreement for a provider joining Medicare
resembles a contract between the provider and the federal government, 270 one
might think that this agreement establishes a contractual relationship between
the federal government and the provider, and that it is therefore unnecessary to
import fiduciary duties into the provider-payer relationship. However, multiple
courts have formally concluded that the agreement is not a contract. 271
Accordingly, a flexible and robust duty of loyalty could apply to the
relationship. Whether or not the provider agreement between the Medicare
program and the participating provider is a contract, the parties cannot account

for certain contingencies when they enter into the agreement. 272 As a result,
guidance to providers requires that they only bill for care that is "reasonable
and necessary." 273 But Medicare has limited ability ex ante to determine what
is reasonable and necessary, largely because the provider has all the expertise
and discretion-and even access to the patient-in the patient's moment of
need. As Professor Frankel has noted, recognition of the fiduciary relationship
is appropriate particularly when a contractual relationship is infeasible:
[E]ven if such contractual arrangements were feasible, the transaction
costs involved in drawing up a detailed prior agreement covering all
possible discretionary uses of power over the life of the relation would
not only be enormous, but also would probably exceed the benefits of
274
the proposed relation.

Not only is the principal-Medicare-unable to "spell out in advance precisely
what the agent should do in all possible future circumstances," but also "the
very purpose of retaining an agent with expertise is undermined if the agent is

270. See Form CMS-460, Medicare Participating Physician or Supplier Agreement, CTR. FOR
SERvS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMS-Forms
MEDICARE & MEDICAID
/downloads/cms460.pdf [http://permacc/RYK7-TANJ] (last visited July 21, 2015).
271. See, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. v. Heckler, 706 F.2d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Upon joining
the Medicare program, however, the hospitals received a statutory entitlement, not a contractual
right."); United States ex rel. Roberts v. Aging Care Home Health, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 810, 820
(W.D. La. 2007) ("Breach of contract is not available because Medicare Provider Agreements create
statutory, not contractual, rights."); United States v. Medica-Rents Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 742, 777
(N.D. Tex. 2003) (citing cases and noting that "a contract did not exist between Medica-Rents and the
government").
272. For instance, these contingencies include what specific treatment plans or procedures will
be administered. Medicare cannot effectively limit, or specify, which plans or procedures are
appropriate for particular patients before the medical examination.
273. See Health Insurance Claim Form, supra note 83.
274. Frankel, supra note 160, at 813.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1088

[Vol. 104:1043

not given room to apply that expertise on behalf of the principal to changing
conditions." 275 This situation calls for a provider-payer fiduciary relationship.
C. JudicialPrecedent
Fiduciary principles have not been explicitly imported in other health care
contexts, including the fraud context. Courts have grappled with whether
providers can be fiduciaries to the Medicare program, but have not recognized
such a relationship. In one of the seminal federal district court decisions
developing the reach and contours of the Anti-Kickback Statute, 276 the court
discussed the applicability of the fiduciary argument to various health care
relationships, but ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's argument:
While there appears to be no basis for a fiduciary relationship between
Dr. Neufeld and the United States Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") or between Dr. Neufeld and the Ohio Department of
Human Services, Office of Medicaid ("ODHS"), there certainly are
elements of a fiduciary relationship between Dr. Neufeld and his
patients. 2 77
The court dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty allegations brought by
the U.S. government-claims tacked on to alleged violations of the False
Claims Act. 278 In reaching a result similar to Neufeld, a second district court
noted that the "Medicare/Medicaid statute does not unambiguously state that
the doctors have assumed a fiduciary relationship towards the United
States." 279 After acknowledging that "[i]t is undisputed that the typical doctorpatient relationship contains elements of a fiduciary relationship," the court
reiterated that "the Medicare/Medicaid statute does not provide that the funds
and the government are included in that relationship, and that the doctors owe
duties of loyalty to the funds and the government as well as to their
patients."

280

But these dismissals of common law actions based on breaches of
fiduciary duty do not provide a complete picture. The argument that providers
are fiduciaries to Medicare has arisen repeatedly in sentencing for health care
fraud offenses. Indeed, under the federal regime and the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, judges must increase the sentences of individuals found guilty of
various health care fraud offenses if they occupied a position of trust. 28 1
Numerous courts have grappled with the fiduciary duty issue in cases involving

275.
276.
277.

omitted).
278.
279.
280.
281.

Sitkoff, supra note 170, at 199.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012).
United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 500 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (internal citation

Id.
United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. 1120, 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
Id.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 3B1.1(c) (2008).
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physicians convicted under America's robust criminal fraud statutes. 282 The
question has been whether the provider occupied a position of trust vis-a-vis
Medicare, with a number of federal circuits holding that "health care providers
who defraud Medicaid or Medicare may be subject to the abuse-of-trust
enhancement." 2 83 Defendants subject to this enhancement have included
facility directors, 284 psychologists, 285 ambulance company owners, 286 andrelevant to this analysis-physicians. 287
This conclusion is, perhaps, unremarkable. 288 After all, physicians occupy
a position of trust, unlike the role one would ascribe to sellers in other
industries. One court discussed the importance of trust2 89 in the medical
enterprise-not only the trust between physicians and patients, but also the
trust between providers and federal health care programs 290 (and, by
implication, taxpayers). The court noted, "[I]n a professional medical practice,
trust between patient and physician is essential and ... the government as
insurer depends upon the honesty of the doctor and is easily taken advantage of
if the doctor is not honest." 291 In other words, both the patient and payer are in
precarious positions when the patient is wheeled into the emergency room.
At least one circuit has ruled differently on the position-of-trust question
for sentence enhancement. The Eleventh Circuit held that a Medicare provider
"does not occupy a position of trust vis-a-vis Medicare." 292 In that case, United
States v. Garrison, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "arm's-length business
relationships are not available for the application" of the abuse-of-trust
enhancement. 293 The court found it important that the defendant reported to a
fiscal intermediary to "review and to approve requests for Medicare
reimbursement before submitting those claims to Medicare for payment." 2 94
Indeed, "[b]ecause of this removed relationship to Medicare, plus [the fiscal
intermediary's] review ... , [the defendant was] not directly in a position of
282. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 (2012).
283. United States v. Hayes, 574 F.3d 460, 480 (8th Cir. 2009) (listing cases).
284. See United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 2003).
285. United States v. Hoogenboom, 209 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2000).
286. United States v. Gieger, 190 F.3d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1999).
287. United States v. Ntshona, 156 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1998) ("We adopt the view of the
other circuits presented with this issue and hold that a doctor convicted of using her position to commit
Medicare fraud is involved in a fiduciary relationship with her patients and the government and hence
is subject to an enhancement under 3B1.3.") (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Adam, 70
F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding enhancement for physician accused of kickback violations).
288. In a recent work, Max Mehlman argued "[t]hat the law should regard physicians as
fiduciaries for their patients would seem to be indisputable." See Mehhman, supra note 175, at 2.
289. See Hall, supra note 21, at 477-82 (noting the value and therapeutic benefit of trust in the
patient-provider relationship).
290. United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1294 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the doctor
must be credited for "services that he rendered that were justified by medical necessity").
291. Id. at 1293.
292. United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 941 (11th Cir. 1998).
293. United States v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 831, 839 (11th Cir. 1998).
294. Id. at 841.
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trust in relation to Medicare." 295 After concluding that the relationship was "too
attenuated," and noting that the sentence guideline provision "envisions ... a
physician who possesses the expertise to create erroneous medical records and,
consequently, fraudulent Medicare reports that are difficult to detect and to
question," the court rejected the enhancement. 2 96
Nevertheless, even that court seemed to imply that the sentencing
enhancement could be appropriate for physicians because of their expertise and
discretion in billing Medicare. 2 97 In the Eleventh Circuit cases, the defendants
were, in Mills, a nurse and businesswoman and, in Garrison, the owners of a
home nursing care entity.298 It appears that the court found the defendants'
professional positions dispositive, 299 which suggests that even the Eleventh
Circuit might apply a sentence enhancement to a providing physician.
D. PracticalUpsides
As is true of much of the canon of health law and policy, the major
challenge accompanying the effort to limit overtreatment in American health
care is achieving the right balance between provider autonomy and patient and
taxpayer protective legal regulation. The facts and figures on overtreatment

belie the claim that the U.S. health care enterprise is over-regulated. 300 The
alarming numbers and examples above demonstrate that there is room for
increased regulation beyond mere payment reform-or at least room for
regulation to rein in the worst excesses. The regulatory challenge is increasing
control over the cost of the health care enterprise without eliminating too much
valuable provider discretion.
The instant proposal-that the provider owe a fiduciary duty to the
Medicare payer-seeks to achieve that balance by adding a mechanism that
both limits health care waste and recognizes the sanctity of the provider's
autonomy. The unique enforcement structure of the fiduciary duty helps this
proposal avoid the pitfalls of many other cost-containment strategies, such as
the criticism that such strategies encourage bureaucrats and insurance
companies to make cost-based decisions to the detriment of both providers and
patients. And significantly, the fiduciary structure relies on the expertise and
295. Id.
296. Id. at 842.
297. See id.
298. Id. at 833-34.
299. See id. at 841-42 ("In contrast to Garrison's lack of discretion and inability to produce the
fraudulent Medicare reimbursement requests as section 3B1.3 envisions is a physician who possesses
the expertise to create erroneous medical records and, consequently, fraudulent Medicare reports that
are difficult to detect and to question."). The court distinguished the different result in Rutgard,
emphasizing that the "enhancement was warranted because the ophthalmologist convicted for
Medicare fraud abused the trust implicit" in the practice and patient-physician relationship. Id.
(emphasis in original).
300. Up to 30 percent of the dollars spent on American health care are wasted. See Buck, supra
note 104, at 466 (noting that more than $700 billion annually is wasted within American health care).
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judgment of the provider-rather than that of a third party-to determine when
the fiduciary duty to the Medicare payer has been discharged.
Requiring providers to owe Medicare a fiduciary duty would seemingly
solve, or at least ameliorate, scenarios like the one exemplified by Lucentis and
Avastin above. Where the provider is choosing between two drugs with similar
therapeutic value and the cost differential outweighs any clinical benefit the
patient would receive from the more expensive drug, the provider would owe a
fiduciary duty to the Medicare payer to prescribe the less expensive and equally
effective alternative. This duty would be a counterweight to Medicare's
powerful incentives for providers to prescribe the more expensive drug in the
above clinical scenario. And like any other wronged entrustor, if the provider
fails to act as a responsible fiduciary, Medicare would be able to access the
common law remedies available following a breach of fiduciary dutyincluding potentially excluding the offending provider from future Medicare
participation. 301 Two points remain: (1) how this regime better ameliorates
overtreatment as compared to anti-fraud efforts; and (2) how an additional
fiduciary relationship for providers reflects the reality of competing forces and
pressures within the delivery of American health care.
First, although enforcing the fiduciary duty relationship may face
resource-based challenges-including the same challenges that have dogged
Medicare enforcement in the anti-fraud context for years 302-this new legal
tool could improve the regulatory environment by "right-sizing" the remedy for
overtreatment. Indeed, a breach-of-duty action carries fewer potential penalties
than the draconian penalties that accompany an anti-fraud action under the
federal False Claims Act. 303
Overtreatment may be structurally insidious, but may also be the product
of both a lack of efficient regulation and incentives that encourage providers to
provide more expensive care. An action for breach of the duty of loyalty seeks
to address the harm through common law remedies, avoiding the massive
statutory penalties that accompany violations of the False Claims Act.
And second, should the instant analysis lead to practical change,
physicians' layered professional duties of loyalty-one to the patient and one
to the Medicare payer-would resemble the balanced and nuanced ethical

301. Medicare has the legal authority to exclude an entity or individual from the program by
either temporarily or permanently revoking the entity or provider's ability to deliver health care to
Medicare beneficiaries. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2012) (listing exclusionary offenses).
302. See Medicare Fraud: A $60 Billion Crime, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUrEs (Oct. 23, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/medicare-fraud-a-60-billion-crime-23-10-2009
[http://perma.cc/7CX3-Q42U] (reporting how the Medicare Director of Program Integrity noted the
size of the Medicare program and Medicare's "extremely limited" oversight budget).
303. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012) (providing for statutory penalties up to $10,000,
treble compensatory damages, and costs); Buck, supra note 32 (highlighting how the False Claims Act
is used to target overtreatment).
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duties that govern another profession: law. Lawyers owe duties to clients 304 and
other duties, like the duty of candor, to the court. 305 A lawyer's duty to be
truthful to the court, for example, does not diminish her duties to the client.
In the instant proposal, doctors would similarly owe duties to both
patients and Medicare's payers. If and when those duties conflict, the
professional must make a judgment, just like the lawyer caught in an ethical
conflict between candor to the tribunal and aggressive representation of the
client. I suggest here that the patient's interests would trump the payer's, unless
they are equal or the clinical options are all advisable.
Lawyers do not represent their clients without limitation. If the client is
engaged in a crime or fraud, the lawyer may not counsel or assist.306 If the
client wants to lie to or deceive a court or judicial officer, the attorney may not
participate in that deception, and may have to disclose the deception to the
court or government. 307 Indeed, these "additional" duties-to the tribunal or
even to the adversary 308-are
not in the lawyer's financial or personal
interests. 309 These duties complicate the lawyer's role and nuance their
professional decision making. The lawyer, in essence, is undoubtedly a

304. See
Rule
1.18: Duties to Prospective Client, AM. BAR
ASs'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model_rules_ofprofessi
onal_conduct/rule_1_18_dutiesof.prospective_client.html [http://permacc/8JAZ-7F29] (last visited
July 20, 2015) (prospective client); Rule 1.9: Duties of Former Clients, AM. BAR AS5'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/modelrules_o fprofessi

onal_conduct/rule_1_9_duties_offormer_clients.html [http://perma.cc/DH3S-WK8Y] (last visited
July 20, 2015) (former client); Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, AM. BAR ASs'N,

&

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model_rulesof professi
onal_conduct/rule_1_6_confidentialityofinformation.html
[http://perma.cc/X42K-5V9M]
(last
visited July 20, 2015) (current client).
305. See Rule 3.3: CandorToward the Tribunal, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org
/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model-rulesof professional conduct/rule_3_3_cand
ortowardthe_tribunal.html [http://perma.cc/E823-YFRF] (last visited July 20, 2015).
306. See Rule 1.2: Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client
Lawyer, AM. BAR AS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications
/model_rules_of.professionalconduct/rule_1_2_scope_ofrepresentationallocation ofauthoritybe
tween_cient_lawyer.html [http://perma.cc/Z98K-7D3Z] (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) ("(d) A lawyer
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent....").
307. See Comment on Rule 3.3, AM. BAR AS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups
/professional-responsibility/publications/model-rulesof.professional-conduct/rule_3_3_candor_tow
ard_the_tribunal/comment_on_rule_3_3.html [http://perma.cc/W9EK-SHFF] (last visited Jan. 29,
2016) (addressing remedial measures, including disclosure, that a lawyer must employ when she
knows that her client has offered false testimony).
308. See Lisa M. Kurcias, Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM

L. REv. 1205 (2000).
309. Indeed, these duties often conflict with a lawyer's desire to win the case or her financial
interest to provide as many legal services as the client will pay for.
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fiduciary to his client, 310 but also a fiduciary to the integrity of the legal
process. 311
Doctors should have the same multifaceted fiduciary obligations.
Although doctors traditionally owe a duty only to the patient, perhaps, like
lawyers, their professional obligations should become more complex and
nuanced. Where appropriate-and particularly where providers are
administering health care paid for by the American taxpayer-providers should
have a duty to be a steward of public resources. In a publicly funded insurance
program, where the state depends on the physician's services, it makes sense to
recognize this second duty of loyalty. Pushing the provider to inculcate this
value-to be a loyal steward of public resources-addresses the overutilization
problem without destroying the provider's discretion. And this constraint does
not place any third parties between the provider and the patient.
As coordinators and deliverers of health care, providers are already
gatekeepers of a valuable resource. A number of ethical duties and legal
requirements govern their actions, and parties depend on them. The instant
analysis merely gives meaning to something Americans may already recognize:
when taxpayers entrust participating providers to care for their elderly, those
providers must owe a duty of loyalty to those taxpayers. This duty should
require physicians to avoid administering excessive and wasteful health care,
which will help to ensure the financial viability of the vital Medicare program.
CONCLUSION

American health care providers continue to administer too much careand care that is too expensive. Now that the ACA has expanded coverage,
added much-needed regulation to the insurance industry, and sought to provide
consumer-based tools for patients, the central future challenge of health law
and policy is the struggle to control cost and utilization. Regulators must strike
a delicate balance between respecting the autonomy and discretion of the
provider and building an adequate regulatory framework to rein in the worst of
the excess.
Somewhat paradoxically, the battles of yesteryear-concerns that
managed care will negatively influence providers to administer less health care
and that patients need more robust protection-have given way to rampant
overtreatment and excess in Medicare and American health care at large. But a
viable solution to the challenge may come from the same place that provided
an answer to the managed care challenge: fiduciary duty. This Article seeks to

310. See Edward D. Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles:
Policy and Ethical Considerations, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1357, 1364 (1994) ("Lawyers always stand
in a fiduciary relationship with their clients.").
311. See Comment on Rule 3.3, supra note 307 ("Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a
tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative
process.").
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expand the fiduciary relationship and recognize a new duty of loyalty that
providers would owe to Medicare payers. The suggestion maintains provider
autonomy by relying on the discretion of the doctor, and thus protecting the
importance and intimacy of the clinical relationship. Meanwhile, it inserts a
much-needed-and potentially overdue--control on the provider to protect
public resources. After all, the health of Medicare, just like the patients who
rely on it, is worth protecting.

